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 Executive Summary 
The Homeland Security Act (HSA), enacted in November 2002, created the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  The legislation combined twenty-two existing 
agencies and 170,000 federal employees into a new cabinet-level department—the largest 
and most complex reorganization of the federal government since the creation of the 
Department of Defense nearly six decades earlier.  Included in this legislation was authority 
for the Department to initiate new approaches to personnel management outside of the 
normal rules of the federal civil service.  This new personnel management authority was 
potentially the most significant change in civil service law since the Civil Service Reform 
Act of 1978 (CSRA).  The personnel management provision of the HSA also turned out to be 
among the most contentious provisions of the proposed law, tying up final passage of the 
legislation until after the mid-term elections in November 2002 and pitting the administration 
and major federal employee unions against one another in a hard-fought battle for support on 
Capitol Hill.   
This report is an analytical case history of the passage of HSA, focused on the 
personnel management section.  It includes a review of the recent history of civil service 
reform, a chronology of the major events leading up to passage of the legislation, and a 
detailed examination of the rhetorical framing of the debate over the legislation, which we 
conclude offers a powerful explanation for the passage of the legislation.  In examining the 
case, we also suggest some important implications for implementation of personnel 
management reform.  This analysis is based on a review of public documents and on 
interviews with key participants.
xi 
 Civil Service Reform 
For much of the early history of the United States, the federal government was small, 
and government workers were little more than clerks.  Positions in government often were 
given to political supporters of elected officials.  As the government grew, so did this system 
of patronage, until it reached its high point in the “spoils system.” The first major reform of 
this system came on the heels of the assassination of President Garfield by a disgruntled 
office seeker.  The Pendleton Act of 1893 created the first modern civil service system, 
overseen by a Civil Service Commission.  Civil service employment was based on selection 
according to qualification, and promotion would be based on merit.  Selection and promotion 
were to be free from political influence.   
This system survived until 1978 when the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) made 
significant changes.  The CSRA abolished the old Civil Service Commission, replacing it 
with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Merit Systems Protection Board 
(MSPB) and the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). The CSRA instituted a system 
of merit pay based on performance and created a new upper-level Senior Executive Service 
(SES).  Many observers have been disappointed with the outcomes of the CSRA. Two 
attempts at pay-for-performance failed and were abandoned; OPM has not achieved the 
anticipated status; the SES failed to produce the hoped-for cadre of highly mobile senior civil 
servants; and personnel management has become complex, unresponsive, and rules-bound.  
The common view held that another round of civil service reform was needed.   But attempts 
at government-wide, large-scale reform have been unsuccessful. Instead, successive 
Presidential administrations have used demonstration projects and other limited and 
incremental steps to achieve smaller scale reforms.  Congress has also enacted important but 
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 smaller-scale targeted reforms. President George W. Bush’s administration has had a 
particular focus on management issues, and homeland security offered an opportunity to 
advance a proposal for personnel management reform in the new department. 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 
After 9/11, the White House established an Office of Homeland Security in the 
Executive Office of the President.  Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge was appointed the 
President’s senior advisor for Homeland Security.  But, even before 9/11, some in Congress 
had been pushing for creation of a cabinet-level Department of Homeland Defense⎯chief 
among them Senator Joseph Lieberman, chairman of the Senate Government Affairs 
Committee.  The administration initially rejected the idea of a new cabinet department, but 
faced with increasing pressure from Capitol Hill, the administration set about to draft a 
proposal for a homeland security department.  A small group of five White House staff 
members, overseen by a senior-level group, was charged with designing the new department. 
They worked in secret in the President’s Emergency Operations Center (PEOC). 
On June 6, 2002, the White House announced its proposal for a new Department of 
Homeland Security.  The administration spoke generally about the need for management 
flexibility in the new department. The Republican leadership on Capitol Hill asked for draft 
legislation quickly, and the staff group worked with OPM and others to draft the legislation 
that was sent to Congress on June 18, 2002. The proposed legislation gave the DHS secretary 
and OPM director authority to institute a new personnel management system 
“notwithstanding” the provisions of Title 5 U.S. Code (U.S.C.) which governs federal 
civilian personnel management.  Homeland Security Advisor Ridge and OPM Director Kay 
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 Cole James took the lead for the administration in testifying before Congress and in the 
behind-the-scenes meetings to promote the legislation.   
Union opposition to the personnel management provision was strong.  The American 
Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) and the National Treasury Employees Union 
(NTEU) asserted that the personnel management proposal threatened collective bargaining 
agreements and eliminated protections for federal workers. Both sides claimed that they were 
willing to consult and compromise, but the personnel management issues were not resolved; 
the legislation remained un-enacted heading into the 2002 elections. Both sides took the fight 
into the November election.  The administration charged the unions and their Democratic 
supporters with holding up legislation that was important to “national security,” and the 
unions charged the Republican Congress and White House with threatening workers’ rights.  
On Election Day, two incumbent Democratic senators were defeated in campaigns where 
these issues were prominent.  When Congress reconvened after the election, the legislation 
was enacted. 
Rhetorical Analysis 
The public debate over the personnel management provision, on Capitol Hill and 
during the 2002 elections, can help to explain the passage of the legislation with its personnel 
management reforms. Prior to 9/11, the debate over civil service reform was stalemated, as 
both sides argued over issues such as strategic human capital management, modernization, 
flexibility, accountability, broadbanding and paybanding, performance-based pay, 
recruitment and retention, union busting and partisan differences.  Our analysis shows that all 
of these issues were argued over in the post-9/11 period, as well.  But after 9/11, the 
proponents of reform cloaked the management argument in the larger context of national 
security.  Each of the issues of debate prior to 9/11, to varying degrees, took on a national 
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 security element. In addition, a whole new broad national security argument emerged. On the 
surface, the debate seemed to have changed from management flexibility vs. workers’ rights 
to national security vs. union collective bargaining.  Yet, when the debate is examined more 
deeply, it is clear that even when both sides engaged in a national security debate, the 
administration made the more powerful national security arguments in the way it framed the 
discussion, especially in matters of strategy, protection and power.  These differences appear 
to have been highly influential in favor of reform. 
Discussion 
A number of themes and important issues are raised in this case history. The 
following is a brief synopsis of each of them. 
Secrecy and General Language.  The process used by the White House to draft the 
proposal that was presented to the Cabinet and sent to Congress was an exception to the 
norm.  The proposal was drafted in secret by a small staff group in the White House.  It was 
not coordinated with affected departments or agencies. This process had advantages as well 
as some offsetting negative consequences. It proved successful in getting a proposal done in 
a timely manner, but that also meant that the concerns of interested parties were not 
addressed until the issue was in the public domain where the debates took on a more strident 
and uncompromising tone. 
The initial public White House discussion of a proposal for a Department of 
Homeland Security addressed only a general need for management flexibility.  As some of 
the members acknowledged in interviews for this study, the staff group lacked expertise in 
civil service laws and rules, so when it came time for the proposal to be put into legislative 
language, experts from OPM had to be consulted, but with little time for detailed work. 
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 Therefore, the bill was written in very general language. This also had its advantages and 
disadvantages.  The less detail there was in the bill, the less there was to be debated, argued 
and amended.  On the other hand, a paucity of detail paved the way for critiques by the 
opposition.   
Congressional Processes and Interest Groups.  The differences in the ways in which 
the House and Senate acted on the Homeland Security bill were important. In the House, 
controlled by the Republicans, action on the President’s bill was fast, coordinated, and led by 
the Republican leadership.  The Senate, however, was split evenly along party lines.  The 
political dynamics in the Senate were very different from those of the House, and efforts to 
expedite a floor vote were frustrated by the inability to invoke cloture.  The Senate 
Republican leadership in the Senate could not expedite the President’s bill as did their 
counterparts in the House. The influence of a single interest group was a significant factor, 
particularly in the Senate.  The ability of the federal employee unions to raise issues and 
mobilize supporters in the Senate led to contentious debate and delay beyond initial 
expectations.  
Rhetoric and the Election Outcome. The outcome of the 2002 congressional 
elections decided the outcome of the HSA.  Republicans gained the majority in the Senate 
and expanded their margin in the House.  Pivotal campaigns were influenced, if not decided, 
on issues surrounding the HSA.  The legislative fight had been taken into the political arena, 
and the election outcome decided the legislative outcome.  
Intent. There are differing views about the intentions behind the HSA personnel 
provision.  Was the intent to use HSA to bring about broader civil service reform? The OPM 
staff members who worked on the language and subsequent regulations say they were 
xvi 
 focused only on DHS.  Yet, others involved in the process saw implications that DHS could 
be the starting point for wider reform.  For the staff of OPM, the focus was on DHS; for the 
White House staff group that drafted the proposal, the focus was DHS with implications for 
advancing the administration’s management reforms; and perhaps for the most senior White 
House officials, the objective was to set the course for widespread reform.  Subsequent 
enactment of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) for the Department of Defense 
and the administration’s proposed Working for America Act are further evidence of the 
White House commitment to personnel management reform throughout the federal 
government.   
Thus we reach these observations: 
• The strategies of secrecy and general language were very effective, at least for 
the short-term goals of drafting and enacting the legislation.  However, later 
developments, beyond the scope of the present study, suggest that the result of 
secrecy and generality has been that the detailed issues must now be fought out 
after enactment, in the context of legal challenges and regulation-writing.  The 
price of secrecy and generality in the design and enactment phases may very 
well be delay and discord during the implementation phase.  If questions of 
politics and policy were not addressed prior to enactment, they must be 
addressed afterward. It is possible that some of the key problems encountered in 
the legislative battles, and perhaps now in the implementation phase, could have 
been tempered by earlier OPM involvement 
• The elections were decisive for HSA, and passage of the legislation can be 
largely explained by the power of the rhetorical framing of the debate. 
• There is the suggestion of both opportunism and intention on the question of 
whether HSA is the beginning of widespread civil service reform. The question 
of intention may depend on the level of the policy maker, but in any case, the 
reform is spreading, albeit with implementation problems.  
Conclusion 
The story of the Homeland Security Act is a rare alignment of policy environment, 
policy opportunity, politics, and rhetorical framing.  The result was enactment of legislation 
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 that many believe would not otherwise have been possible. Why did the confluence of this 
particular policy environment, policy opportunity, and politics combine to result in 
enactment of controversial civil service reform?  One powerful explanation is the framing of 
the debate and the rhetorical framing that each side employed.  Simple stated, the supporters 
of reform presented their arguments in terms of national security; their opponents argued in 
terms of collective bargaining rights.  In the post-9/11 policy environment, “national 
security” was a political trump card.  If the first civil service reform was triggered by a 
national calamity, so was the most recent.
xviii 
 I. Introduction 
A. Background 
The Homeland Security Act (HSA), passed by Congress and signed by President 
George W. Bush in November 2002, created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  
The legislation, a response to the new security threat presented by the attacks on New York 
and Washington on September 11, 2001, combined twenty-two existing agencies and 
170,000 federal employees into a new cabinet-level department.  This action represented the 
largest and most complex reorganization of the federal government since the creation of the 
Department of Defense after World War II.  Included in this legislation  was new authority 
for the Department to initiate new approaches to personnel management outside of the 
normal rules of the federal civil service.  This new personnel management authority was the 
most significant change in civil service law since the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 
(CSRA).  The personnel management provision of the HSA also turned out to be the most 
contentious provision of the proposed law, tying up final passage of the legislation until after 
the mid-term elections in November 2002, and pitting the administration and major public 
sector unions against one another in a hard-fought battle for support on Capitol Hill. The civil 
service reforms in the HSA of 2002 have been labeled “Trojan horse politics,”1 called 
“politically clever,”2 and referred to as an “aggressive campaign to dismantle the federal civil 
                                                 
1 Donald P. Moynihan, “Homeland Security and the U.S. Public Management Policy Agenda,” Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 18, no. 2 (2005): 171-196. 
2 David Firestone and Elisabeth Bumiller, “Stalemate Ends In Bush Victory on Terror Bill,” New York Times, 
13 November 2002, A1.  
1 
 service.”3  Though ultimately successful in achieving passage of the legislation, the 
administration is still facing political and legal challenges to its implementation.   
This report is an analytical case history of the passage of HSA, focused on the 
personnel management section.  It includes a review of the recent history of civil service 
reform, a chronology of the major events leading up to passage of the legislation, and an 
examination of the issues, strategies and arguments. We have analyzed the case for the 
education it can provide and the questions it raises about civil service policy-making.   
B. Methodology 
We have approached this project from the perspectives of two scholarly fields that are 
not commonly joined—Public Policy and Rhetorical Communication.  This case involves 
issues of policymaking and executive-legislative relations familiar to the student of politics 
and public policy.  At the same time, an examination of communications strategies and 
themes is essential to understanding the legislative outcome. Accordingly, we have employed 
an interdisciplinary approach that we believe enriches the story and the analysis. Initially, we 
conducted an extensive search of public documents and materials in order to determine 
background information, identify the key actors, and examine the processes and 
communication in drafting and presenting the legislation. Secondly, we conducted interviews 
with many of the people involved to further develop the story of the case. In examining the 
debate over the legislation, we analyzed the publicly available materials and extracted the 
arguments for and against the legislation. The analysis was confined as much as possible to 
direct quotations, which were categorized into themes according to rhetorical strategies and 
the potential effects the arguments may have had on key audiences.  Finally, we have 
                                                 
3 American Federation of Government Employees, Homeland Security Talking Points.  
2 
 attempted to merge the narrative history with rhetorical and policy analyses into a coherent 
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 II. A Brief History of US Civil Service Reform 
A. Jacksonian Democracy and the “Spoils System”  
Today’s federal worker must be knowledgeable, skilled, educated, and able to adapt 
to the ever-changing technologies and social advancements of society. This has not always 
been the case.  For most of the nation’s first century, federal workers were likely to have 
secured their jobs through political placement rather than because of their knowledge and 
skills. This system of political patronage reached its peak in the administration of President 
Andrew Jackson.  “Jacksonian democracy” justified political patronage by arguing that 
representation of politically loyal common people in the federal bureaucracy was a logical 
extension of democracy.  But the federal government was becoming a larger and more 
complex organization. The number of federal employees had swelled from just 20,000 prior 
to the Civil War to 132,000 in 1883.4  Incompetence, corruption and high turnover after each 
election became associated with the patronage system.  The resulting costs of the patronage 
system were becoming apparent by the late nineteenth century.   
B. The Pendleton Act and the Birth of the Merit System 
Reform would require a dramatic event.  The assassination of President Garfield by a 
disgruntled office-seeker gave life to the reform cause. On May 15, 1882, Senator George H. 
Pendleton of Ohio, chairman of the Senate Committee on Civil Service Reform and backed 
by the National Service Reform League, sponsored a bill to introduce merit system principles 
                                                 
4 Office of Personnel Management, Biography of an Ideal: A History of the Federal Civil Service, accessed 22 
July 2005: available from http://www.opm.gov/BiographyofAnIdeal/
5 
 into the federal government, replacing the long-established practices of patronage.5 In 
November, 1882, Republicans lost the majority in Congress in an election that turned on the 
issue of reform of the spoils system. The Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act was passed by 
Congress and signed into law by President Chester Arthur on January 18, 1883.  As we shall 
see in the present case, an election outcome⎯one hundred twenty years later⎯would also 
lead to civil service reform. 
The Pendleton Act established the bipartisan Civil Service Commission. It provided 
that federal workers would be “hired on the basis of merit, promoted within the framework of 
civil service rules, are not to be explicitly involved in political campaigns and ... once beyond 
a probationary period, essentially have job tenure.”6  Originally, only about ten percent of 
federal workers were covered by the Act, but this coverage steadily expanded to virtually all 
civilian federal employees. 
C. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) was the first major reform of the civil 
service law to be enacted since the Pendleton Act. President Carter’s Personnel Management 
Project designed CSRA, which was part of the Carter administration’s Reorganization 
Project to make the federal government more businesslike and efficient.  Though the 
principles of merit were always an explicit part of the Pendleton civil service system, the 
definition of merit had never been clearly outlined in law. Title I of the CSRA enumerated 
the following as principles of merit: diversity, talent, fair treatment of employees, equality of 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ronald L. Johnson, “Patronage to Merit and Control of the Federal Government Labor Force,” Explorations in 
Economic History 31 (1994): 91-2. 
6 
 reward, integrity, efficiency, adequate performance, protection from adverse action for 
partisan political reasons, and protection for whistleblowers.7
The key provisions of CSRA included:  
– Abolition of the Civil Service Commission and creation of the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) to be the central personnel management 
agency, the Federal Labor Relations Board (FLRB) to oversee labor-
management relations, and the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) to 
enforce and adjudicate merit principles in federal employment. 
– Creation of the Senior Executive Service (SES) and merit-based initiatives for 
senior managers. 
– A new performance appraisal system to replace the out-dated performance rating 
system. 
– Linking pay to performance through a new merit pay system for mid-level 
federal managers. 
– Authority to conduct demonstration projects in order to experiment with various 
personnel systems and policies. 
– Defined labor relations administration between union representation and 
management of the Federal Civil Service.8 
CSRA was seen as a system based on merit that would remain flexible with the 
changing environment of government while also protecting civil servants from political 
influence. President Carter envisioned a system that would be created from within, would be 
accepted by the system as a whole, and would be contemporary and flexible enough to 
organize and manage the government for the next 100 years.9  
However, reviews of CSRA implementation were not favorable.  At the five-year 
point, CSRA had run into pay problems and the changing priorities of a new administration.  
                                                 
7 Donald P. Moynihan, “Protection versus Flexibility: The Civil Service Reform Act, Competing Administrative 
Doctrines, and the Roots of Contemporary Public Management Debate,” The Journal of Policy History 16, no. 1 
(2004): 4. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Office of Personnel Management, Biography of an Ideal. 
7 
 At the ten-year point, the general conclusion was that CSRA had fallen short of its lofty 
objectives.  For instance, pay-for-performance had failed twice due to problems in funding 
and implementation. The SES had failed to become the elite, mobile, senior executive corps 
that its founders had envisioned as most senior executives did not move between top 
management positions. OPM did not achieve the hoped-for status on a par with the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) in personnel policy and management.  And federal 
personnel management came to be characterized by complex rules. By the twenty-year 
anniversary of the CSRA, the focus on civil service seemed to be targeting a future reform 
agenda for a merit system that would support better efficiency, effectiveness and improved 
governmental performance.10
D. Reform Initiatives of Recent Administrations 
A review of personnel management initiatives of recent administrations indicates that 
successive Presidential administrations have used demonstration projects and other limited 
and incremental steps to achieve smaller-scale reforms civil service reforms.  Congress has 
also enacted important but smaller-scale, more targeted reforms. Attempts at government-
wide, large-scale reform, however, have been unsuccessful. 
1. Reagan Administration 
Federal personnel management under CSRA began with President Jimmy Carter.  
The succeeding president, Ronald Reagan, sought to utilize key provisions of CSRA to 
increase the responsiveness of the civil service to the Executive branch by strategically 
                                                 
10 See Douglas A. Brook, “Merit and the Civil Service Reform Act,” in The Future of Merit, ed. James P. 
Pfiffner and Douglas A. Brook (Washington: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000), 4-10. 
8 
 appointing key personnel in order to carry through his administration’s policy agenda.11 Also, 
just as his predecessor had done, President Reagan continued to push for reduced 
bureaucracy and streamlined procedures for improving performance.  In 1986, President 
Reagan proposed the Civil Service Simplification Act “which proposed to exempt some 
federal agencies from many centralized civil service requirements and standards, while 
keeping other agencies in the centralized fold.”  Although the Civil Service Simplification 
Act did not pass, many of its components became a consistent part of the reform dialogue.12
In addition to President Reagan’s effort to continue reforming the civil service system 
through legislation, an alternative approach, piecemeal and less visible, was already 
underway.  Demonstration projects, authorized under Title VI of CRSA enabled OPM to 
waive federal rules to allow agencies to experiment with personnel management innovations. 
The experiments were to be evaluated by OPM in order to learn lessons that might be applied 
to the rest of the government.13 For example, the demonstration project at the Naval Air 
Warfare Center Weapons Division at China Lake, California operated a pay-for-performance 
system for over twenty-five years. The China Lake demonstration project sought to “develop 
an integrated approach to pay, performance appraisal, and classification; allow greater 
managerial control over personnel functions; and expand the opportunities available to 
employees through a more responsive and flexible personnel system.”14 This demonstration 
project, initiated in 1980, was able to achieve the type of results that had been envisioned by 
                                                 
11 Office of Personnel Management, Biography of an Ideal. 
12 Patricia W. Ingraham, “A Laggard’s Tale: Civil Service and Administrative Reform in the United States,” paper prepared 
for the Conference on Comparative Civil Service Reform (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 5-8 April 1997), 2. 
13 Donald P. Moynihan, “Protection versus Flexibility,” 6. 
14 US Government Accountability Office, Human Capital Implementing Pay for Performance at Selected 
Personnel Demonstration Projects, GAO-04-83 (Washington, DC: January 2004).  
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 CSRA. Eventually, the China Lake demonstration project became a permanent personnel 
management system when it was signed into law in 1994.15
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) initiated a demonstration 
project in 1986 to promote better hiring and retention.  This project used alternative 
personnel management practices in hiring and retaining qualified personnel in highly skilled 
positions. Over a period of ten years, the project competed effectively with comparable 
private sector employers in compensation and retention by employing selective bonuses and 
merit increases, giving managers greater authority over pay and hiring decisions, and creating 
an employee environment that trusted the rules and regulations directing their duties.16
2. The George H. W. Bush Administration 
The next administration, under President George H. W. Bush, was faced with the 
public’s eroding perception of the federal service.  Bush and OPM Director Constance Berry 
Newman undertook a series of aggressive initiatives to improve confidence in the public 
service and to attract and retain quality employees. President Bush successfully achieved 
legislation to close the pay gap between the private and public sectors, vetoed the 1990 Hatch 
Act Reform Amendment that would have allowed federal workers to actively participate in 
political parties, and endorsed legislation on protecting employees who report fraud, waste 
and abuse through the Whistleblowers Protection Act (WPA).17  





 Other measures were still being suggested and enacted to reform the federal civil 
service. For instance, in a response to the S&L crisis, Congress enacted the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). The legislation granted 
several financial regulatory agencies independence to establish their own compensation 
systems. The drive to obtain FIRREA-type compensation flexibilities continued over the next 
decade.18  
3. The Clinton Administration 
Just as President Carter had come into office with a management reform agenda that 
included plans to fix the civil service system, President Clinton came into office with plans to 
reinvent government that included plans to improve personnel management. “Reinventing 
government” was a broad initiative focused on ridding government bureaucracies of red tape 
and unnecessary idiosyncrasies that foster inefficiencies. It emphasized downsizing the 
federal workforce, providing broader-based training to its personnel for wider employability, 
and initiating employment flexibilities in order to empower employees through practices 
allowable in the private sector but never before offered within the federal government.  One 
such initiative came through three executive orders issued by President Clinton to establish a 
National Partnership Council and to mandate labor-management “partnerships” in federal 
agencies.  Agencies were to form labor-management committees, involve employees and 
union representatives as full partners with management to identify problems and craft 
                                                 
18  Doris Hausser, OPM, e-mail to author, June 5, 2006 
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 solutions, provide training in consensual methods of dispute resolution, negotiate over 
subjects permissible under Title 5, and evaluate progress under these partnerships.19    
The Clinton-Gore National Performance Review (NPR) of 1993 recommended 384 
changes to the federal government, including the following in human resource management: 
(1) Create a flexible and responsive hiring system; (2) Reform the general schedule 
classification and basic pay system; (3) Authorize agencies to develop programs for 
improvement of individual and organizational performance; and (4) Authorize agencies to 
develop incentive award and bonus systems to improve individual and organizational 
performance.20
Attempts at wholly reinventing the entire federal government met with mixed results, 
but there were other attempts by the Clinton administration to restructure the civil service.  
The Workforce Restructuring Act was aimed at reducing the number of federal employees.  
These reductions were often accomplished through reductions in hiring or placing a freeze on 
hiring and, ironically, are now blamed for contributing to the looming retirement crisis.21  
The proposed Personnel System Reinvention Act (PSRA) was intended to allow individual 
agencies to take control of the design, implementation and execution of their personnel 
systems. Although the bill originally went to Capitol Hill with labor support, it did not make 
it out of committee in either house.22 The Omnibus Civil Service Reform Act would have 
established fifteen demonstration projects, with five having no limitations on the numbers of 
                                                 
19 Bill Clinton, “Labor Management Partnerships,” Presidential Executive Order N. 12871, 1 October 1993. 
20 United States Government Accountability Office, Management Reform: Implementation of the National 
Performance Review’s Recommendations, GAO/OCG-95-1 (Washington, DC: author,  December 1994). 
21 United States Government Accountability Office, High-risk Series, GAO-01-263 (Washington, DC: author, 
January 2001). 
22 Patricia W. Ingraham, “A Laggard’s Tale,” 9. 
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 people affected.  Congress did not enact this legislation either.23  However, Congress did act 
on another, more targeted civil service reform when it removed the Federal Aviation 
Administration from all Title 5 provisions. Getting out of Title 5 represented a kind of system 
disaggregation that also became attractive to other agencies.24
The Clinton administration also attempted to make some innovative use of 
demonstration projects authorized under CSRA.  Demonstration projects were authorized to 
test new methods or concepts in personnel management. The Clinton administration seemed 
to use some demonstration projects to exempt certain organizations from specific provisions 
of Title 5, to provide flexibilities that were not otherwise available.25  Title 5 provides legal 
coverage for all federal workers, establishes the general pay schedule for government 
employees, and has, therefore, been the legislative focus for civil service reforms. Most 
reforms up to this point had been legislated as exemptions from or changes to Title 5.  
Demonstration projects were undertaken in some agencies, including the Department 
of Commerce, Naval Sea Systems Command Warfare Centers (NAVSEA), Naval Research 
Laboratory (NRL), Army and Air Force research laboratories, and the Acquisition Workforce 
Personnel Demonstration Project (AcqDemo). The NAVSEA and NRL projects were 
initiated under the Laboratory Quality Improvement Program (LQIP), a joint-service effort to 
improve and streamline the business and management processes of the Department of 
Defense (DoD) laboratory community.26 The AcqDemo project, authorized by Congress in 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Doris Hausser, OPM, e-mail to author, June 5, 2006 
25 James R. Thompson, “The Civil Service Under Clinton,” Review of Public Personnel Administration 21, no. 
2 (Summer 2001): 87-113. 
26 Ibid., 92. 
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 1996, provided management flexibility to facilitate a reconfiguration of the acquisition 
workforce, including a proposed 40-percent reduction in personnel. This project could have 
covered 95,000 personnel, but it encountered union opposition and only subsequently 
covered about 5,000 personnel.27  Congress also acted to provide certain personnel 
flexibilities for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  This was the first time agency-specific 
chapters had been added to Title 5, setting the stage for future agency-specific chapters for 
NASA, the SEC, DOD and DHS. 
4. The George W. Bush Administration 
The George W. Bush administration came to office with both a policy agenda and a 
management focus.  The Bush administration addressed its agenda for personnel 
management reform as part of the President’s Management Agenda (PMA), begun in 2001, 
as a comprehensive program to identify management reforms and improve government 
performance in five key areas.  One of these priority areas is the “Strategic Management of 
Human Capital.” 
Also, in his first month in office, President Bush revoked the Clinton executive orders 
regarding labor-management partnerships and the requirement that agencies negotiate on 
discretionary subjects as authorized in Title 5.28   This action would later contribute to union 
opposition to HSA.  According to NTEU president Colleen Kelly, this “sent a very clear 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 93. 
28 George Bush, “Revocation of Executive Order and Presidential Memorandum Concerning Labor-
Management Partnerships,” Presidential Executive Order 13203, 17 February 2001. 
14 
 message [...] that this is what the administration thought of unions. So, from there, every 
opportunity they had to try to take away rights from employees and/or unions, they did.”29
Early personnel management reform initiatives growing out of the President’s 
Management Agenda were the Freedom to Manage Act and the Managerial Flexibility Act. 
The Freedom to Manage Act would allow agencies to identify and propose elimination of 
existing statutes that limited effective management and force Congress accept or reject the 
changes on a fast-track basis.30 This proposition was met with immediate controversy and 
quickly disappeared.  The Managerial Flexibility Act sought to make specific amendments to 
Title 5, including additional management flexibilities in hiring critical personnel, greater 
authority for continued retirement incentives, ease of establishing demonstration projects, 
creation of individual agency personnel systems, and greater pay flexibilities to increase 
performance-based rewards.31 This legislation also failed to win sufficient support to become 
law.  However, many of its provisions were later enacted, except those that would have 
expanded authority for demonstration projects or given OPM authority to establish 
permanent alternative personnel systems.32 The Bush administration was having no more 
success than its predecessors in pushing broad personnel management reform through 
Congress.  According to Richard Falkenrath, Special Assistant to the President and Senior 
Director for Policy and Plans in the Office of Homeland Security: 
The President had a management agenda pre-9/11, and it wasn’t getting any 
traction. The President’s Management Agenda [...] basically wanted to improve 
the quality of management in the federal Executive Branch. The hallmarks of 
                                                 
29 Colleen Kelly, interview by authors, 22 September 2005. 
30 Donald P. Moynihan, “Homeland Security,” 175. 
31 Donald P. Moynihan, “Homeland Security,” 176. 
32 Doris Hausser, OPM, e-mail to author, June 5, 2006. 
15 
 [PMA] were: less Congressional micro-management, greater or broader 
statutory mandates, larger appropriations accounts, and executive discretion to 
hire and fire and control the departments. The philosophical essence of the 
President’s Management Agenda was basically to treat department and agency 
heads like CEOs, and let them control their agencies.33
Thus, the Bush administration had the policy framework for addressing personnel 
management reform in place prior to September 11.   
Before September 11, then, a succession of Presidents had proposed reforms in the 
management of federal personnel.  Not all of the reforms proposed by the four 
administrations from Reagan to George W. Bush were identical, even though sometimes the 
language sounded similar.  For instance, some focused on management “flexibility,” some on 
employee “flexibility.” It seemed that there was more consensus that a problem existed with 
personnel management in the federal government than agreement about the nature of the 
problem or the remedies to address it.  But dissatisfaction with the status quo was 
widespread, with the personnel system generally regarded as a rules-bound barrier to 
effective and efficient government performance.  Meanwhile, demonstration projects were 
experimenting successfully with new ways to recruit, retain, train, pay and provide incentives 
for federal employees and Congress was enacting a few targeted, incremental reforms.  
Though the large-scale reforms requiring legislation had failed to be enacted, the stage was 
set for reform should an opportunity arise. 
                                                 
33 Richard Falkenrath, interview by authors, 22 September 2005. 
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 III. Case History of Design and Enactment of Personnel 
Management Reform in the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 
On November 25, 2002, President George W. Bush signed H.R. 5005, the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, into law. The Act directed the largest reorganization of the federal 
government since the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947. This chapter provides a 
case history of the enactment of this historic legislation, focusing on the personnel 
management provision of the bill. The case describes the political and policy environment 
preceding introduction of the administration’s proposal, identifies the processes, 
organizations and people involved in designing the proposed legislation, describes the debate 
over the legislation including those who lobbied for and against it, and concludes with its 
enactment after the dramatic elections of November, 2002. 
A. Preceding Events 
Chapter II outlined the personnel management policy environment that preceded 
September 11, 2001, as a succession of Presidential administrations sought to improve the 
management of personnel in the federal government.  Also preceding 9/11, and increasingly 
thereafter, were efforts to improve the nation’s preparedness for attacks on the homeland, 
specifically to create better federal organizational capability to deal with homeland security.  
1. Hart-Rudman Commission  
The Hart-Rudman Commission, led by former US Senators Gary Hart and Warren B. 
Rudman, was commissioned to conduct the most comprehensive review of American 
17 
 security since the National Security Act of 1947.34 The commission worked between July 
1998 and February 2001, issuing reports in three phases. The commission recommended 
creation of a new National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for 
planning, coordinating, and integrating the various US government activities involved in 
homeland security.35 The commission recommended that the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), the Border Patrol, the Coast Guard, and the Customs Service 
be placed in this new agency.  
The commission discussed the faults within the federal civil service and 
recommended changes to ensure this system helped provide for the nation’s security. The 
aging of the civil service workforce, the difficulty in hiring quickly, the need to retain 
Information Technology (IT) personnel, and the requirement for multi-lingual civil servants 
were among the issues they identified.36
The commission also suggested that the President develop a comprehensive strategy 
to heighten ability to prevent and protect against all forms of attack on the homeland, and to 
respond to such attacks if prevention and protection failed.37  But, the commission was 
operating under the belief that an attack could occur within the next quarter century; it did 
not foresee the attack that occurred on September 11, 2001.  
                                                 
34 United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for 
Change. (Washington DC: author ). Available from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssg/
35 United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Roadmap for National Security: Addendum on 
Implementation, (Washington DC: author, 15 April 2001). Available from 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssg/addendum/Implementation_Plans.pdf
36 United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Imperative for Change.  
37 United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Addendum on Implementation. 
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 Others in the administration were also thinking about the need for a new organization 
for protecting the homeland.  Joel Kaplan recalled: 
Prior even to September 11th, in May of 2001, the Vice-President had been tasked 
with reviewing the organizational structure for weapons of mass destruction [and] 
counter-terrorism.  He had hired Admiral Abbot to be the head of that office.  I 
believe Admiral Abbot was supposed to start around September 5th or 10th. So, within 
the administration, there already [was] some thinking that we needed to look at how 
the government is organized for these sort of complex issues.38  
2. September 11, 2001 and after 
A major terrorist attack on the United States homeland was not predicted to happen so 
soon after the Hart-Rudman Commission issued its report, of course. But the attacks of 9/11 
provided the impetus for change, and they demonstrated the relevance of some of the 
Commission’s findings. Professor Donald Moynihan describes the attacks as creating 
disequilibrium in the political system, which gave the President the opportunity to create 
change or reorganization.39 John Gartland, then Director of Legislative Affairs at the Office 
of Personnel Management, stated that without the attacks of 9/11, personnel management 
reforms such as those in the HSA of 2002 would “not have seen the light of day.”40 Richard 
Ryan refers to the birth of DHS as a rare opportunity for President Bush to seize the 
momentum and implement personnel reform, perhaps even extending it throughout the entire 
federal government.41  
                                                 
38 Joel Kaplan, interview by authors, 26  September, 2005. 
39 Donald P. Moynihan, “Homeland Security,” 192. 
40 John Gartland, interview by authors, 28 August 2005. 
41 Richard W. Ryan, “The Department of Homeland Security Challenges the Federal Civil Service System: 
Personnel Lessons from a Department’s Emergence,” Public Administration & Management (3 August 2003): 
103. 
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 3. Initial Attempts at Reorganization 
On October 8, 2001, the President issued an executive order that established an Office 
of Homeland Security (OHS) within the Executive Office of the President.42 Later that day, 
Governor Tom Ridge was named Director of OHS, and assumed the position of “Assistant to 
the President,” a title like those of other senior White House counselors and policy advisors.  
Like other White House staff appointees employed at the President’s discretion, Ridge did 
not occupy a statutory position, and his appointment did not require Senate confirmation.43  
While Ridge’s status gave him a privileged advisory role to President Bush, it 
shielded him from Congress and limited the OHS budget to discretionary funds from the 
White House office budget.44 Director Ridge did not have either formal authority or budget 
control over many of the organizations he was to coordinate.  Moreover, he was out of the 
reach of the Congress and, hence, not obligated to testify about matters related to OHS.  Joel 
Kaplan explained these circumstances surrounding Ridge’s position caused some tension: 
There was an issue with getting somebody to testify in front of the Congress.  
Congress wanted one person who could come up and testify about the government’s 
Homeland Security efforts. There’s a long-standing Executive Branch position that 
White House Assistants to the President, as opposed to [Senate-confirmed] cabinet 
secretaries, did not testify except only in rare instances […] Governor Ridge, as Head 
of Homeland Security, was an Assistant to the President. So, there was constant 
tension that [Congress] wanted somebody to come up and be accountable for all of 
the administration’s efforts. That was a source of some friction.45
                                                 
42 George W. Bush, “Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security,” Presidential Executive Order 
13228, 8 October 2001.  
43 Richard S. Conley, “The War on Terrorism and Homeland Security: Presidential and Congressional 
Challenges,” paper prepared for the Conference, Assessing the Presidency of George W. Bush at Midpoint: 
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 On Capitol Hill, more elaborate organization designs dealing with homeland security 
began to appear. On May 5, 2002, Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), a prospective 
Democrat presidential candidate, introduced a bill (S. 2452) to establish a Department of 
National Homeland Security and the National Office for Combating Terrorism. The head of 
the new department, who would be both a member of the Cabinet and the National Security 
Council, “would have the rank and power,” said Senator Lieberman, “to ensure that the 
security of our homeland remains high on our national agenda, and that all necessary 
resources are made available toward that end.”46 The bill was referred to the Government 
Affairs Committee, which Lieberman chaired and where he would start to move the bill 
quickly through committee consideration.  The administration initially opposed the creation 
of a new cabinet department, but pressure for a new agency was building in Congress.  At the 
same time, Director Ridge was facing administrative problems running his office.  As 
reorganization proposals gained momentum on Capitol Hill, the idea of creating a new 
Department began to develop in the White House. 
A memo written by Richard Falkenrath, policy advisor to Ridge,47 proposed a new 
organization merging the Coast Guard, Customs Service, and Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) into a border protection agency. According to Bruce Lawlor, White House 
Homeland Security Staff Senior Director for Protection and Prevention, this reorganization 
was needed because:  
at the time, when you approached the border, you had to go through about 
four different agencies to be processed through. It made no sense. We 
                                                 
46 Harold C. Relyea, Homeland Security: Department Organization and Management, RL31493, (Washington 
DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 2002), 31. 
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 literally had situations down in the southwest border where you had two 
highway lanes; one lane would be manned by Customs; one lane would be 
manned by the INS, with completely separate rules as to how people were 
processed into the country.48  
This reorganization encountered resistance from many in the Cabinet to whose 
Departments these agencies belonged. Joel Kaplan explained, “What you had was sort of 
natural jurisdictional, territorial pulls where everybody said, ‘you can’t remove this from my 
agency; it would be devastating.’ It just ground to a halt....”49 Bruce Lawlor said: 
We went out to all the departments.  We engaged them; we talked to them; 
we showed them drafts.  It was interactive. We tried to be collegial. We 
tried to […] come to some sort of consensus. There was resistance, and near 
the end [...] there was a meeting of the principals, cabinet secretaries, before 
the President to consider this. It was presented; the cabinet secretaries 
almost went into revolt. And that was the end of it.50
4. White House Designs New DHS 
Regardless of resistance to the proposed border protection agency, President Bush 
instructed his chief of staff, Andrew Card, to come up with proposals for a homeland security 
department. Card organized a White House staff group to develop a homeland security 
agency proposal in secret, without explicit consultation with or advance notice to 
congressional leaders, cabinet secretaries, or agency heads.51  
The staff group that met secretly in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center 
(PEOC) was a working group of five White House staff, which would become known as the 
                                                 
48 Bruce Lawlor, interview by authors, 23 September 2005. 
49 Joel Kaplan, interview, 26 September 2005.  
50 Bruce Lawlor, interview. 
51 Donald Moynihan, “Homeland Security,” 178. 
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 “G-5.”52 They were Richard Falkenrath; Mark Everson, then comptroller of the Office of 
Federal Financial Management and later Deputy Director for Management of OMB; Joel 
Kaplan; Bruce Lawlor; and Brad Berenson, Associate Counsel to the President. The G-5 
group answered to an oversight group of administration principals: Chief of Staff Card; Josh 
Bolten, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy; Mitch Daniels, Director of OMB; White House 
counsel Alberto Gonzales; and Nick Calio, head of White House Legislative Liaison.53  This 
group was tasked with developing the concept for reorganizing the federal government to 
deal with homeland security.  
Members of the group worked in secret.  Joel Kaplan explains,  
It was secret in the beginning because we wanted freedom of deliberation and 
real thought. It was a terrific process. Later, it was secret because there was a 
sense that we were sort of brought along kicking and screaming, and this was 
sort of going to happen anyway. But the truth is this was exceptionally hard to 
get done. Especially because of the Congressional jurisdictional problems and 
the fact that this has to be done as one fell swoop or else it’ll never get done. 
It’ll get nickel-and-dimed to death.54
This potential opposition included Cabinet members, intent upon keeping their 
departments intact, Members of Congress who would attempt to protect their committee 
interests, and union leaders interested in maintaining their right to collective bargaining. 
5. Presidential Announcement of June 6, 2002  
On June 6, 2002, the President announced his proposal to create the Department of 
Homeland Security. The announcement was a planned, coordinated event orchestrated to 
                                                 




 announce the President’s plan to all the key Washington players within a short time frame.  
Lawlor states: 
  We had a timed rollout strategy; it was quite remarkable. For a period of about 
three days, it was timed down to the half-hour, who was doing what, when it 
was going to happen, who was going to go on what show. I think the President 
or Andy Card notified the Speaker and the Majority Leader in the evening. In 
the morning there was a Cabinet meeting at nine o’clock. All the Cabinet 
members were there. The President walked in and said “This is what I’m going 
to do. Any questions?” It was the most wonderful thing I’ve ever seen: “This is 
what I’m going to do. I’m the President of the United States.”  […] It was a 
tremendous exercise of leadership.  George Bush has got guts, and once they 
understood it, with maybe one exception, they all saluted and did what was 
right.55
Management flexibility was addressed only in general terms at the time of the 
announcement. Briefing the press as a “senior administration official,” Homeland Security 
Advisor Ridge said “it is our hope … that as we send specific legislation to the Hill that this 
new cabinet secretary … will be given the freedom to manage; i.e. we’d like to see some 
flexibility …so that they can move people and resources around in times of crisis or 
emergency. I think that’s critical.”56  While the announcement itself was relatively 
straightforward, the proposal and the issues it addressed were rife with complexity.  
B. The President’s Proposal for a Department of Homeland Security 
The designers of the DHS had many issues to address—including reorganizing 
numerous agencies and dealing the with the management challenges of integration.  They 
also had an opportunity to create new approaches to organization and management rather 
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 than simply replicate old bureaucracies.  There were also practical issues to be dealt with like 
drafting legislation on a tight schedule and dealing with potential opposition. 
1. A New and Complex Organization 
The figures below illustrate the challenge of this reorganization. Figure 1 shows the 
many organizations, departments, and agencies involved in homeland security functions.  
 
Figure 1. Major Cabinet Departments and Agencies Involved in Homeland Security57
Figure 1 illustrates the challenge for the White House Office of Homeland Security, 
trying to coordinate policy and tie organizations together with a unifying concept when they 
did not work within the same overall organization. Figure 2 depicts a reorganized 
department, streamlining the various functions under four main components: Information 
                                                 
57 Department of Homeland Security.  “Major Cabinet Departments and Agencies Involved in Homeland 
Security,” Available from www.dhs.gov.  
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 Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Emergency Preparedness and Response, Border and 
Transportation Security, and Science and Technology.  
 
Figure 2. Department of Homeland Security Organization Chart58
Bruce Lawlor discussed the organizational challenge: 
When we originally built the Department, if you think about it, you’ve got 
information, critical infrastructure protection—that’s two of your functions. That’s 
one Directorate. We’ve got the borders, law enforcement and transportation security. 
There’s another Directorate. And emergency response and recovery—that’s the third 
Directorate. We only had three Directorates when we started. Then the Vice President 
came along and said, “You’ve got to do something more about bio-terrorism.” That’s 
the fourth Directorate, Science and Technology.59
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 The merger of twenty-two agencies posed large integration challenges in personnel 
management.  The entities to be merged into DHS consisted of seventeen different unions, 
seventy-seven existing collective bargaining agreements, nineteen financial management 
systems, twenty-two human resources servicing offices, and eight payroll systems. Mason 
Alinger, Deputy Legislative Director of the House Committee on Government Reform, 
stated: 
You’re melding together twenty-two different departments and agencies; you’ve got 
[170,000] employees;60 you’ve got seventy-two collective bargaining agreements; 
you’ve got all these different things. You can’t put that stuff together, shove it in one 
box and pretend like it’s going to work.  
That was our soundest argument: that we need to just let them wipe the slate clean 
and start with a new system or else this thing is doomed from the start.61  
Alinger suggests, therefore, that the mere act of merging disparate entities into a new 
department necessitated looking at a new system of personnel management.  OPM’s Doris 
Hausser explains: “Personnel management experts familiar with the entities that were to be 
combined were keenly aware ... that an extraordinary number of detailed agency specific 
legislative provisions affecting personnel management were embedded in their authorizing 
legislation.”62   
2. Management Issues 
Others, however, were more inclined to argue that it was the urgent nature of the 
mission of DHS that called for new approaches to management.  The White House proposal 
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 addressed three important areas of “management flexibility”: budget authority (the ability to 
reprogram funds), reorganization authority, and personnel management authority.  About 
personnel management, Rep. Rob Portman (R-OH), a member of the House Select 
Committee on Homeland Security, said, “It’s absolutely critical, if this department is going to 
work, that the President be able to take the twenty-two different personnel systems [...] and 
meld them, together in a way that we [...] make an effective agency to combat terrorism.  The 
agility of the terrorist needs to be matched by a more agile federal workforce.”63
In addressing management issues, the members of the G-5 were advised by OMB 
Director Daniels to include ideas from the President’s Management Agenda. The need for 
reform in personnel management was so evident to the G-5 that they spent very little time in 
deciding that personnel management reform would be part of the DHS legislation.64 Bruce 
Lawlor stated: 
It wasn’t a big debate. This represents an opportunity to change the way federal civil 
service is wrought. And we need to do that; it’s in desperate need of reform. There 
was nobody there that didn’t think it was in desperate need of reform. So, to that 
extent, the decision to do it was very easy and not contentious. I don’t want to say the 
decision was made lightly, but I don’t think it was ever a debate.65  
On Capitol Hill, Congress seemed most troubled by budget and reorganization 
authorities and their effects on congressional authorization and appropriations processes and 
committees.66  Concern over the personnel management flexibilities would come later 
. 
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 3. Drafting Legislation 
The President’s original proposal was presented as a concept.  It was not presented in 
legislative language. The G-5 thought there would be ample time to take an organized 
approach to writing the legislation. But, as Falkenrath explains, there was only a short period 
of time between the announcement and the need to submit legislative language. 
Speaker Hastert looked at the calendar and said, “Alright, Mr. Vice President. We’ll 
do this. But you’ve got to give me the language […] in five days.” We weren’t 
prepared to do that. We’d done really good fact sheets and press releases and all that, 
little booklets and stuff, but legislative language to transmit to the Hill—we still had 
to prepare it. So, we’re like: “Oh my God. What are we going to do?” We got a 
legislative drafting expert out of DOJ, had him assigned to the White House, and 
really quickly put together a 38-page bill. That was what we transmitted to the Hill.67  
Berenson also discussed the short period of time to produce the legislative language.  
Originally, we had about four weeks to write the bill.  However, the Vice President 
and Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert made a deal to get the bill to Capitol Hill 
quickly in order to get it passed by the August recess.68
Coordination of the legislative drafting was assigned to Brad Berenson. When it came 
time to write the legislative language on personnel management, the G-5 turned to the Office 
of Personnel Management for drafting assistance. OPM formed its own small working group.  
According to OPM’s Ed Flynn, that language was constructed essentially by a group of five 
people at OPM: Jeff Sumberg, Deputy Assistant Director for Workforce Relations; Ed 
Hickey, Senior Advisor to the Chief of Staff Paul Conway and Senior Advisor for Homeland 
Security; John Landers, of the OPM Retirement Policy Division; Harry Wolf, from 
Congressional Relations; and Flynn.69 Significantly, the draft included the Director of OPM, 
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 along with the Secretary of Homeland Security, as jointly responsible for any new 
regulations.  This served to institutionalize a role for OPM in the design and operation of any 
new personnel management system for DHS. 
According to Berenson,   
[I] put together a legislative drafting team. This group sub-delegated some of the 
drafting work to OMB for contracting issues and OPM for the personnel provisions. I 
was put in charge of the process for writing the legislation.  This would be the first 
time the President had sent actual bill language to Congress because all previous 
proposals had been outlines or concepts […] We worked around the clock. So, we 
didn’t have a lot of time to tinker with what we received from OMB and OPM. We 
might have kicked the tires a little, but we basically just dropped their work into the 
bill.70  
The entire bill comprised only thirty-eight pages.  The language developed by the 
staff group was an attempt to use simpler wording and delegated authority. Richard 
Falkenrath explained,  
We did it the old-fashioned way which says, “There shall be created a Department. 
All powers are vested in the Secretary. The Secretary shall have all total control over 
the Department. The Department shall consist of the following assets and authorities 
which shall be transferred to him. He shall then have the authority to reorganize, 
reprogram, etc. He shall have the authority to promulgate new personnel regulations, 
notwithstanding Title 5.” It was an ideal way of legislating, which is just very short, 
simple, granted authority, the way they used to do it in Congresses 1 through 50.71
Section (a) of the personnel management provision of the proposed bill contains just 
sixty-eight words: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title [Title 5], the Secretary of 
Homeland Security may, in regulations prescribed jointly with the Director of 
the Office of Personnel Management, establish, and from time to time adjust, 
a human resources management system for some or all of the organizational 
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 units of the Department of Homeland Security, which shall be flexible, 
contemporary, and grounded in the public employment principles of merit and 
fitness72
Section (b) required simply that any new system be “flexible and 
“contemporary,” preserve the principles of merit and fitness, not waive equal 
employment or other employee rights and remedies, ensure the right to organize and 
bargain collectively, and made certain pay provisions non-waivable.  This section 
also contained a five year sunset provision on authority to issue new regulations.73
This provision of the HSA introduced the most dramatic potential shift in the 
direction of federal personnel management flexibility since CSRA, perhaps even since the 
Pendleton Act. Writing in general language to empower the Secretary and OPM Director to 
establish new personnel management practices, avoided time-consuming debate over the 
details of any such plan.  Director James explained, “Our initial take at this was: let’s make 
the legislation as broad as possible so that we could have the freedom to fill in the details as 
we went along.”74   
The administration’s bill, HR 5005 was introduced in the House on June 24, 2002 
with expectations that it would pass quickly.  After all, the idea of a homeland security 
agency had originated in the Senate and, politically, it seemed that few officeholders would 
want to stand in the way of a homeland security bill, especially in an election year. However, 
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 strong opposition was encountered in the Senate, largely due to strong union opposition to 
the personnel provisions. 
3. Opposition Emerges  
The first signs that the bill’s personnel management language might cause political 
problems emerged quickly.  Those key words, “notwithstanding any other provision...” 
immediately triggered a problem. As Falkenrath describes:  
We had no idea what we were “notwithstanding.” Title 5 is a big Title.  It turns out 
Title 5 contains whistleblower protections. So, within two days the unions are putting 
out a press release that says the President wants to end whistleblower protections. 
Well, that’s nonsense. We don’t want to end whistleblower protections. We wanted to 
give the Secretary the authority to write new regulations for the personnel system, 
notwithstanding what had come before.75  
When asked if the G-5 group had anticipated opposition, Bruce Lawlor stated, “Yeah, 
we knew that…we expected that. But, hey we were building the biggest organization since 
World War II. Who cared?”76
It turned out that the major public-sector unions cared a lot. Still smarting from the 
revocation of the Clinton-era labor partnerships, union leaders saw the HSA personnel 
provisions as just one more piece of evidence that the Bush administration was out to break 
the unions.  In labor’s view, the administration wanted to “eliminate collective bargaining 
rights [...] and exercise unchecked power over federal workers.”77  Moreover, the union 
leadership was bothered by the lack of consultation. In the words of AFGE president Bobby 
Harnage, the administration’s approach showed “arrogance and the impatience”: 
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 I think they got to looking at it and saying, “You know, these guys don’t want to 
change. We’re wasting our time talking with them. We’ve got the support of 
Congress. With the American public behind us, all we’ve got to do is scream, 
‘Homeland Security.’ Let’s just do it.” They didn’t want to be confused with 
facts, and they didn’t want too many people adding to it because that made it a 
little more confusing. So, you had this group that was put together, sat down 
and drafted it exactly the way it was wanted. […] That’s a very poor way to do 
business.78
The fight over the DHS bill became, in large part, a fight over personnel management 
rules.  John Gartland agrees, “it was the personnel reforms. That’s what the unions had a real 
problem with. You had the biggest change in the civil service since the civil service was born 
in 1978. You gave authority to the new Secretary, and OPM. That never had been done 
before.”79  The struggle over the personnel reform portion of the HSA led to delayed action in 
the Senate past the one-year anniversary of 9/11 and up to the mid-term elections of 2002.  
C. Homeland Security and the Fight over Personnel Management 
The focus of action on homeland security shifted to Capitol Hill, where the 
administration, Democrats and Republicans in the House and Senate, and union leaders each 
adopted processes and strategies to deal with the issues.  The longest-lasting and most 
divisive issues were the questions of personnel management.  
1. Congress takes up the Legislation 
Homeland Security Advisor Tom Ridge and OPM Director Kay Cole James were the 
prime advocates for the administration on Capitol Hill, testifying before committees and 
persuading Senators and House members.  Director James recalls, 
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 I remember the first time I was called over to the White House for one of those 
meetings with legislators.  The President talked about the legislation and how 
important it was, and the first thing out of the box was the personnel issue.  So 
the President said, “Kay why don’t you … [brief us on the issues?] I was at 
every meeting at the White House, and I always had to make the case.”80  
Congressional action began in the House and Senate almost simultaneously, but on 
different legislative proposals.  In the Senate, on June 24th, the Government Affairs 
Committee favorably voted the Lieberman Bill (S. 2452) out of committee.  This was the 
same day that the administration’s bill, HR 5005 was introduced in the House.  In the House, 
Speaker Hastert appointed a nine-member Select Committee, chaired by Majority Leader 
Dick Armey, to coordinate the House legislative process on this legislation.  Optimism still 
prevailed.  On July 16th, Senator Lieberman offered his prediction of the schedule for this 
legislation.  
The House will take the proposal up [...] next week. Our committee [will] mark 
up our bill in the Senate next Wednesday, take it to the floor the following 
week, and if all goes well, these bills will pass both houses before [...] the 
August recess and our conference committee will work together and I think as 
early as September we’ll bring out a common bill to the floor of each house.81
The Senate Committee moved first, on the Lieberman Bill, but the House was quicker 
to move on the administration’s bill. As Falkenrath explains:  
The House was in Republican control. They set up this unbelievable forced 
march in July where they took our bill and simultaneously referred it to 13 
committees, full committees of jurisdiction and all done simultaneously. I 
mean in one week they all had hearings and everything. And then they all 
marked up, and they all transmitted their mark-ups to the Select Committee on 
Homeland Security whose nine members then dealt with their mark-ups, and 
basically, that’s where the deal in the House got done.82
                                                 
80 Kay Cole James, interview. 
81 Senator Joseph Lieberman, interview. PBS Online NewsHour, 16 July 2002. 
82 Richard Falkenrath, interview. 
34 
 Committee hearings and mark-up sessions went on in all of the committees immediately; all 
the committees discharged their bills on July 12th.  Once the House committees reported their 
mark-ups, the Select Committee acted quickly to bring a bill to the floor. The bill provided 
the Secretary of DHS with greater management flexibility in the areas of performance 
appraisal, job classification, pay rates and systems, labor management systems, and adverse 
actions and appeals. The bill also provided civil rights and disabled protections, preserved 
veteran’s preferences in hiring, and assured that the Fair Labor Standards Act, Social 
Security Act and the Family and Medical leave Act would continue to apply to federal 
employment. The bill also preserved the workers’ right to organize, but continued the 
president’s authority to limit collective bargaining for national security reasons and extended 
this authority to the secretary.83
The House took up the bill on July 26.  Six amendments were defeated on close 
party-line votes.  The House passed the bill on a vote of 295 to 132. 
The bill now moved to the Senate, where two cloture motions were made to try to 
bring a bill the floor. Both were withdrawn, and Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle 
announced that a vote on the bill would be put off until after the August Congressional 
recess. The real fight over the bill would take place in the Senate.  Falkenrath explains,  
In the Senate, there was a totally different dynamic where Lieberman was in 
charge of this issue. There was no simultaneous referral; there was a single 
referral to Government Affairs Committee. He thought he could write this bill. 
He had a bunch of hearings and a bunch of thoughts.  He had his staffers 
working on it, and he was talking to members. And he really thought he was 
going to write this bill. What he was coming up with was just unacceptable to us 
on many fronts—especially on this one [personnel provisions].  I mean, on this 
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 one he was totally captive to the unions and gave us nothing. I mean, actually 
restricting the Executive in some ways. It was just totally unacceptable. It was 
not the only unacceptable thing, but it was totally unacceptable.84   
When the Senate returned to Washington after the summer recess, the bill was 
brought to the floor for consideration on twelve days between September 4 and September 25 
before returning it to committee. 
As the debate raged on and off the Senate floor, it became more political and more 
partisan. The administration began portraying the Democrats in Congress as special interest 
supporters and against the nation’s security. A search of the Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents from August through the November 5 election revealed over three 
dozen public statements by President Bush in which he criticized the Senate or blamed 
“special interests” connected to Democrats for the delay in the homeland security bill.85 
Senate Republican Leader Trent Lott was quoted as saying, “The homeland security 
department is being blocked by Senate Democrats who are determined to protect the interests 
of their union bosses in the bureaucracy.”86  Maureen Gilman, NTEU Director of Legislation, 
argues that it was the Republicans that had been preventing votes from taking place:  
[T]hroughout the whole thing, the administration and their Republican allies on the 
Hill were much more successful than we and the Democrats on the Hill were in […] 
the public relations aspects of who was holding this up. I think there were six cloture 
votes that the Democrats wanted.  Republicans voted that down but were still able to 
maintain the idea that the Democrats are preventing the establishment of the 
Department of Homeland Security. And it actually went through the election that 
way.87  
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 Ridge and James assert that they were open to working with the unions.  Ridge 
explains, “We spent a lot of time assuring them [legislators] that we would engage with the 
unions, and we did seriously consider many of their objections and recommendations.”88  
They claim also to have been willing to make deals and concessions to get the bill passed.  
According to Kay Cole James, “We were willing to put a lot on the table.  At first I don’t 
know if they really believed we had the authority to do that and could deliver.  But we did.”89  
NTEU President Colleen Kelly describes these interactions somewhat differently: “Any time 
I requested a meeting, we got a meeting. [...] [T]he issue was just that very often the 
conversation that would seem to me was going very well [...] and then we would leave the 
room, and they would go right back to where they started from.”90  
As the midterm elections drew nearer, however, the willingness of the administration 
to make deals or grant concessions decreased.  NTEU’s Maureen Gilman says, “We were 
working with Senators Chaffee, Nelson and Breaux to get a compromise.  We were willing to 
give up virtually anything, [...] but as they got closer to the election they wanted this political 
issue.  They did not want a compromise.”91  Brad Berenson seems to mirror this viewpoint 
from the other side. 
We were willing to make compromises and worked with some on the Hill such as 
Senators Nelson, Breaux, and Chaffee.  At some point, Senator Daschle must have 
decided that he couldn’t go into the elections without the public sector unions behind 
the Democrats, and he probably felt that the Democrats were safe on the security 
issue because of their support of the Iraq resolution.  It was becoming clear that our 
efforts at reaching a compromise were being frustrated by the leadership.  We were 
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 astounded, but tried to keep going. Finally, the [White House] Legislative Oversight 
Group decided to quit trying to reach an agreement. [...] Compromise could have 
been reached; we were willing to do things.92
No compromise was reached, however, and the issue remained undecided as Congress 
headed into the November elections. 
2. The Issues  
There were clear differences between the administration and the unions on real issues 
that were important for both.  Each side also had a different perception what the fight was all 
about.  The two major issue areas under debate were: (1) management flexibility to fix a 
broken personnel management system versus (2) collective bargaining agreements and the 
rights of organized workers.  
For the administration and its supporters, the issue was about providing the “flexible” 
tools for management to use to deploy and manage employees in the new Department.  Since 
the Bush administration had already begun to pursue a management reform agenda that 
included reforms in human capital management, HSA provided an opportunity for them to 
advance this agenda, and they took the opportunity.  The administration believed that the 
entire federal government needed personnel management reform, but in this case, they 
argued that reforms were particularly necessary for the urgent mission of DHS.  Rep. 
Portman said the President was asking for “some basic flexibilities in the area of pay, 
performance, classification and in appeals and adverse actions [...] the kind of managerial 
and the kind of personnel flexibility he’s going to need.”93  Senator Fred Thompson argued 
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 that the mission of DHS required a new approach, “We can’t operate the Homeland Security 
Department the way so many other departments have been operated with the waste and 
inefficiency that we’ve seen.  So this is a monumental step in the right direction.”94
During the debate, reform supporters were asked to provide examples that illustrated 
the need for personnel management changes. In response, the administration noted the 
difficulty in relocating people quickly, offered a hypothetical example of the difficulty in 
firing a drunken border guard, and cited union rules that interfered with workers wearing 
radiation detecting devices.  All of these examples would themselves become problematic 
and debatable.  Nevertheless, the administration’s argument was supported by a widespread 
belief that the civil service system was rules-bound, unresponsive, outmoded and in need of 
improvement.  
Union leaders saw this issue in a different light; they disputed the details of the 
proposal and also questioned the motives behind them. Brian DeWyngaert, Assistant to the 
President of AFGE, saw the reforms as an attempt by the administration to weaken the civil 
service system, to shift from “public administration” to “political administration.”95  
DeWyngaert cites a paper, written by two former Republican personnel management 
officials, that asserts, “The President can expect opposition from official Washington’s 
‘permanent government,’ a network that includes the career civil service, and its allies in 
Congress, the leaders of federal unions, and the chiefs of managerial and professional 
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 associations representing civil servants.”96  DeWyngaert expresses union distrust of the 
administration, arguing that the real goal of the administration was to “control what agencies 
do [...] to change some of the personnel rules [...] to the point where they are going to follow 
your line because you control their pay, their determination at will, their layoff.”97
There were also questions about whether the administration had election-year politics 
in mind.  Since the administration had initially opposed creation of a new department, 
Colleen Kelly suggests the White House had decided that if it were going to bow to pressure 
from Congressional Democrats on this issue, they would “‘put something in there to make it 
really difficult for the Democrats […] as they move toward the next election.’ And this was 
the personnel provision.”98  But Bruce Lawlor denies any political motivation on the part of 
the G-5: “there was never, for a minute, any political motivation behind trying to change the 
civil service system [...] The only direction he [Card] ever gave us was ‘Do the right thing. 
You do what you think is right.  We’ll worry about the politics if it comes to that.’”99
Adding to the suspicions about motives, the revocation of the Clinton-era partnerships 
and the denial of organizing rights at the Justice Department on national security grounds 
gave reason for labor leaders to fear that the administration was pursuing an agenda to 
weaken the federal unions.  Colleen Kelly asserts, “The Homeland Security Act became the 
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 vehicle that they had been looking for forever [...] to take away existing civil service rights. 
[...] They saw their opportunity and they used it.”100   
This fight coalesced over the question of the President’s authority to abrogate 
collective bargaining agreements if he deems it a national security necessity.  Presidents have 
had this authority for over thirty years, but union leaders and their supporters feared its use 
by this administration.  Rep. Robert Menendez (D-NJ) explained:  
A variety of rights—whistleblower protection, collective bargaining rights, and 
other important issues [...]—will in essence be subject to being waived by a 
presidential determination that this is a national security interest. [...] The reality 
is that the president earlier this year used those similar provisions in reference to 
the US Attorney’s Office where over 500 individuals who were seeking to be 
unionized were suddenly taken away of all of their rights including their right to 
collectively bargain.101
The unions and their supporters tried to address this question through bill language 
that would restrict the President’s authority.  The original Lieberman bill contained very little 
language about management other than Section 106—which addressed sound financial and 
fiscal management principles and environmental, safety and health requirements.102   A 
provision to limit the President’s ability to abrogate union agreements on national security 
grounds was added to the Lieberman bill and on the House floor; Rep. Morella offered 
amendments to HR 5005 to address these union concerns. Senator Thomson argued the 
administration’s position: 
Here is authority that presidents have had ever since the days of Jimmy 
Carter.  Democrat and Republican presidents both have had a right to 
abrogate collective bargaining agreements in the interest of national 
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 security on particular occasions. The president simply wanted to keep the 
same authority that these other presidents had.103
The efforts to amend the president’s authority failed, but they fueled the key debate.  
Colleen Kelley reflects:   
There was the collective bargaining issue, where there was a great deal of 
fear among the employees that were going to be put into the new 
department, that the President was just going to be able to issue an executive 
order and take away their bargaining rights. He clearly had that authority. 
We were trying to get a grandfather clause that said if your duties don’t 
really change, the president can’t just issue an executive order and take you 
out.  I think things could have gone differently if we had not been pushing 
on the language to limit the president’s authority.  That’s really what they 
picked up on.104
This debate, now framed as national security vs. labor rights, would be taken into the 
November elections. 
3.  Personnel Management Reform as an Election Issue 
Homeland security did become an issue in the fall 2002 election campaigns.  In 
particular, the campaigns of two Senate Democrats, Jean Carnahan (MO) and Max Cleland 
(GA), were affected by campaigns that accused them of opposing the HSA.105 The midterm 
elections in Missouri and particularly Georgia became the most important elections for the 
Bush administration and its homeland security proposal. Campaign ads portrayed Senator 
Cleland, a triple amputee Vietnam War veteran, as anti-national security and pro-special 
interest.106  President Bush visited Missouri several times in October and November to lend 
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 support to Rep. Jim Talent’s senatorial bid against incumbent Jean Carnahan, arguing at one 
campaign stop that “Jim Talent understands what I’m talking about. You put him in the 
Senate; we’ll get us a good homeland security bill, which will make it easier for presidents to 
protect America.”107
Colleen Kelly, President of the NTEU, reflected, “They framed those who were in the 
Democratic Party supporting us, and even the one or two Republicans or Independents who 
were on our side—to keep this thing alive—they framed them as unpatriotic.”108  John 
Gartland, dismayed that that the bill had not been voted on by the Senate prior to the mid-
term election break, stated, “At that time, I thought we were dead, because I never realized 
what was going on in Georgia to defeat Cleland using this issue.”109 Washington Post 
columnist Stephen Barr observed, “The defeat of Max Cleland, a Vietnam war veteran who 
said that labor rights and employee rights should not be changed and who then goes down in 
defeat in his home state, left Democrats very embittered on this front.”110   
The election had its impact, but was introducing civil service reform into the 
homeland security bill part of a deliberate Republican election strategy? Colleen Kelly 
suggests that it was:  
They could put the Democratic candidates, especially in the Senate, on the 
hot seat for the election. They didn’t have much at risk because their move 
to create a department was a defensive political move. [...] So they could 
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 throw it out there and say, “OK Democrats, you’re either going to hurt your 
union friends or you’re going to vote to create this department.”111  
Senator Thompson denies that the issue was deliberately set up for the elections, saying, “I 
don’t think anyone was holding out simply to have an election year issue.”  Nevertheless, 
Senator Breaux observed, “I can give you the names of a number of people who are not 
going to be back from Congress in January as a result of this issue.  It was a big political 
issue.”112
When the results from the midterm elections were in, the administration had gained a 
Republican majority in the Senate and enough support to pass H.R. 5005 with the 
management flexibilities provision intact. 
4.  The Return from the Mid-term Elections 
Prior to the election, the Senate had been split 50-50 between Democrats and 
Republicans.  The Democratic election losses in Georgia and Missouri, along with 
Republican victories in Minnesota and North Carolina, gave the administration the needed 
Republican majority in the Senate. Coupled with Republican gains in the House, the election 
results were broadly interpreted as a national judgment on Bush’s stand on homeland 
security.113 Passage of the HSA did not have to wait for a new Congress to be seated in 
January, however. Instead, Congress returned for a rare post-election “lame duck” session to 
take up the HSA.  John Gartland explains, “It [the elections] sent a message back here. A 
bunch of other Democrats and Republicans, they quickly got along, and they passed that bill. 
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 ‘Get it out of here! Look at what happened to Cleland and others’.”114  Colleen Kelly, 
president of NTEU, also credited the election results as leading to passage of the bill: 
Well, in the end it went through because of the mid-term elections. I like to 
think we’d still be fighting about it even if it was a very narrow margin 
keeping the debate alive. So, the only reason it ended was because of the 
results of the mid-term election. And seeing people like Max Cleland being 
portrayed as unpatriotic because he supported the rights of the employees who 
provide the protection on the front lines everyday. I’ll never forget those mid-
term elections. I knew that night what was going to happen. And it did. You 
know, within two weeks they acted on the legislation.115  
After the elections, the House language was generally just inserted into the Senate 
bill, and last-minute compromises were reached on some key issues. A final deal struck 
between the White House and Senators John Breaux (D-LA), Ben Nelson (D-NE) and 
Lincoln Chaffee (R-RI) provided that DHS would  collaborate with unions before any rule 
changes and that the President must notify Congress and wait ten days before waiving union 
agreements for national security reasons.  Such waivers would be limited to a four-year 
period 
The final language on personnel management therefore amounted to considerably 
more than the original proposal.  Title VII, Subtitle G, Section 761 adds a new Chapter 97 to 
Title 5 for the management of personnel in DHS.  It includes the broader language of the 
House bill as further amended in the Senate.  In addition, a significant other amendment, 
championed by Senator George Voinovich (R-OH) incorporated as Title XIII of the HAS, 
establishes new Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCO) throughout the agencies of the 
federal government.  It also sets new requirements for OPM to establish systems, standards, 
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 and metrics for assessing the management of human capital.  Though managerial in its focus, 
the CHCO provision can be viewed as an additional civil service reform, applicable 
government-wide, accomplished through the vehicle of the HSA. 
The authority for the secretary and director of OPM to establish a new personnel 
management system for DHS was retained.  Senator Fred Thompson, Ranking Republican on 
the Government Affairs Committee said: 
The president wanted for the administration to be able to put into effect some 
new rules and regulations. Workers rights are still going to be protected [...] but 
it takes too long to hire. It takes too long to get rid of people who need to be 
moving on. It takes too many levels of appeals and so forth.  The president 
needed some flexibility.  He will be given that flexibility now.116
On the Senate floor, Senate Amendment (S. Amdt.) 4901, the final HSA language 
was proposed by Senator Thompson.  In a last ditch effort to block the bill, Senator 
Lieberman proposed S. Amdt. 4902 to create instead a National Commission on Terrorist 
Attack upon the United States.  A cloture vote was passed 65-29 to limit debate and permit 
the vote. S. Amdt. 4901 passed in the Senate 90-9 on November 19. The House of 
Representatives subsequently passed it on November 22nd.  President George W. Bush signed 
PL. 107-269 on November 25, 2002.    
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 IV. Argument Comparison Before and After 9/11 
A.  Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we described the chronology of events that led to the passage 
of the HSA of 2002, including the recent history of attempts at civil service reform since the 
Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978. Within the context of this case history, we 
introduced some of the key arguments made by both proponents and opponents of the 
personnel management reforms. Interestingly, many of the proponents’ arguments had been 
made by previous administrations but had not led to legislative and organizational changes. 
Several interview participants suggested that national security and 9/11 played a large role in 
the adoption of proposed personnel management reforms in the HSA. Consequently, we set 
out to investigate more closely the claim that 9/11 and national security were key to the 
passage of personnel management reforms.  
The following chapter explores whether and how the arguments in this case differ 
from that of previous reform attempts. 
B.  Materials and Method 
1. Materials 
To examine the arguments for personnel management reform, we consulted a variety 
of materials in the public record that illustrated both sides of the debate. Specifically, we 
searched for sources using research databases such as Lexis Nexis, Proquest, JSTOR, and the 
Homeland Security Digital Library, and we drew from a variety of materials including 
newspapers, scholarly reports, speech transcripts, congressional hearings, and other public 
accounts.  Although we consulted many sources (including interview data) to gain general 
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 background into the debate, we limited our actual data set to only those arguments that could 
be directly attributable to a specific source and are available in the public record. By limiting 
our data to directly attributed material, we reduced the risk of imposing third-party 
interpretation of specific arguments and instead only analyzed the terms of the argument as 
made by the original author/speaker/organization. In many cases, our evidence for arguments 
was in the form of direct quotations taken from hearings, speeches, press briefings, or other 
public events. In other cases, we relied on “talking points” issued as the official position of a 
participant in the debate, such as the American Federation of Government Employees 
(AFGE) union. In all cases, we consulted only those arguments that were in the public 
record. There is a particular utility in restricting our data to only those arguments made 
publicly; namely, such arguments would most likely be those which were circulated in the 
public sphere. In other words, in comparing the arguments both before and after 9/11, it is 
important to view the debate as the public viewed it in order to examine the potential effects 
of the arguments on those audiences.  
2. Method  
Once we gathered the materials for analysis, we reviewed the arguments categorizing 
them first as having been made either before or after 9/11, and second as either for or against 
personnel management reform. We then categorized the arguments into 10 primary themes to 
assess which arguments, if any, were distinct to each time period either prior to or following 
9/11. It is important to note that many of the arguments were related to one another; however, 
we categorized the arguments into themes based on those that seemed to be particularly 
prevalent throughout the debate.  Our search for arguments reflects our intent to capture the 
entirety of the debate to the greatest extent possible. Whereas we may have missed some 
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 sources in our search, we are confident that the primary, recurring arguments in the debate 
are reflected in our analysis.   
We make extensive use of italics throughout the analysis as a means to emphasize 
certain key points in the arguments. All use of italics, therefore, indicates our emphasis rather 
than the original speakers’, unless otherwise noted.  
B. Findings 
Our analysis resulted in the isolation of 10 primary arguments, summarized as 
follows:  
(1) Strategic Human Capital Management 
(2) Modernization  
(3) Flexibility  
(4) Accountability  
(5) Broadbanding and Paybanding  
(6) Pay-for-Performance 
(7) Recruitment and Retention 
(8) Union Busting 
(9) The Party Line: Democrats vs. Republicans 
(10) National Security  
Table 1, below, summarizes our findings. The sections that follow provide a narrative 
comparison of all arguments for personnel management reforms.
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 Table 1. Issues of contention between proponents and opponents of personnel management 







Reform Proponents Reform Opponents 
Strategic Human Capital 
Management Yes Yes 
Need to change system to 
better manage human capital 
Safeguards exist within current 
system for managing human 
capital; training needed, not 
reform 
Modernization Yes Yes 
Current system is outdated 
and needs to be replaced 
Proposed changes were a 
regression back to old systems 
where managers had too much 
authority 
Flexibilities Yes Yes 
Department needs 
management flexibilities to 
transform system, be 
responsive 
Particular flexibilities sought 
would undercut employee rights, 
overly empower Executive 
branch and management 
Accountability Yes Yes 
Need for employee 
accountability demanded 
overhaul of system 
Current system already ensured 
employee accountability 
Broadbanding/                 
Paybanding Yes Yes 
Broadbanding would improve 
recruiting and retention of 
good federal employees 
Broadbanding is overly 
subjective and does not have 
strong enough history of success 
Pay-for-performance Yes Yes 
New system would reward 
performance and motivate 
employees 
New system would compromise 
teamwork and encourage 
management favoritism 
Recruitment and 
Retention Yes Yes 
Current system has outmoded 
hiring and retention 
strategies; new merit-based 
system needed to hire/retain 
top talent 
Biggest barriers to recruit/retain 
workers are trends toward 
outside contractors and lagging 
pay, not hiring or retention 
processes  
Union busting Yes Yes 
Union protections would 
remain intact—even 
enhanced—under the new 
system 
Reform efforts aimed at 
destroying union power and 
union representation for 
employees 
Arguing along Party 
Lines Yes Yes 
Republicans generally took 
the position of sweeping 
reforms 
Democrats generally sided with 
the union position of fewer or 
more moderate reforms 
National Security No Yes 
Proponent arguments that 
were made before 9/11 
resurrected after 9/11 with 
new rationale of national 
security 
Challenged national security 
arguments as disingenuous; 
hurt employees and, thus, hurt 
national security  
1. Strategic Human Capital Management (SHCM) 
A prevailing theme within the data involved the concept of strategic human capital 
management (SHCM). SHCM is a broad concept that can encompass many of the arguments 
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 that follow. However, we note it as the first theme here because it was often characterized, by 
both sides in both time periods, as a general rationale for various positions.  The GAO report, 
High-risk Series: An Update, of January 2001 added SHCM to its list of government 
functions that were designated as high risk. The government’s approach to managing its 
people—its human capital—is presented as the critical missing link in reforming and 
modernizing the federal government’s management practices.117 In the pre-9/11 time period, 
reform advocates provided numerous arguments that stated SHCM was an area of 
government service that needed to be reformed. For example, the GAO report stated, 
“Serious management challenges across a wide range of federal agencies, covering programs 
that involve billions of federal expenditures, can be attributed to shortcomings in how 
agencies manage their human capital.”118 Reform opponent Bobby Harnage, AFGE 
President, also engaged in this argument, largely agreeing on the need to focus on human 
capital in the federal government. However, he countered the claim for the particular reforms 
being proposed and, instead, advocated for better employee training within the existing 
system: “The idea of performing at one’s best gets to the issue of organization performance 
through developing the workforce’s skills and knowledge. […] Like a lot of reinvention 
concepts, it is likely that we’re at a point where the importance of training is not fully 
understood by Executive Branch agencies, at least not in a strategic sense.”119  
The arguments for SHCM in the post-9/11 timeframe are similar in nature to those 
from the pre-9/11 era. For example, Tom Ridge was quoted as saying that the goal was to 
                                                 
117 United States Government Accountability Office, High-risk Series, GAO-01-263, (Washington, DC: author, 
January 2001). 
118 Ibid., 8.  
119 Bobby Harnage, “Training Employees to be their Best,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight of 
Government Management, Restructuring, and the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs, 18 May 2000.  
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 create a “contemporary, flexible human resource system based on the principles of merit and 
fairness […] in the civil service system.”120 Opponents of reform in the post-9/11 era 
acknowledged the SHCM argument, but again challenged the effectiveness of the particular 
reforms being called for by proponents. For example, NTEU President Colleen Kelly stated, 
“The GAO and others have repeatedly warned Congress that the federal government faces a 
human capital crisis. […] How will the DHS be able to retain its most experienced 
employees when they [employees] will be faced with the possibility of losing the rights and 
benefits they have enjoyed for their entire career?”121
The use of human capital management as an issue in the arguments for and against 
reform was presented by both sides, in both time periods. Reform advocates claimed that the 
government should change the system to better manage its human capital, whereas reform 
opponents advocated that there were already safeguards within the current system to manage 
human capital challenges, but that training should be a critical component to SHCM.  
2. Modernization  
The GS pay system was originally developed in the 19th Century, and the CSRA 
attempted to modernize the system somewhat. The case for further modernization was an 
issue addressed by both sides in the debate in both time periods. For example, pre-9/11, Vice 
President Al Gore stated during a campaign speech that “We find time and again federal 
organizations have bound themselves to old, outdated, self-defeating practices […] It’s as if 
the old culture is an invisible cage that constrains thinking, cramps attitudes and lowers 
                                                 
120 Ellen Nakashima and Bill Miller, “Bush to Ask Workers for Flexibility on Homeland Security: President’s 
Pep Talk to 3,000 Employees to Include Appeal on Civil Service Rules,” The Washington Post, 10 July 2002, 
15.  
121 Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing Before The Committee On Ways and Means House of 
Representatives One Hundred Seventh Congress Second Session, 107-74, (Washington, DC: Congress, 26 June 
2002).  
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 horizons.”122 We could find no specific mention of modernization in this time period by civil 
service opponents. However, opponents consistently asserted that the current system 
provided the means to accomplish many of the reformers’ goals; consequently, it is plausible 
that opponents would take issue with an argument that the system was as outdated as reform 
proponents claimed.  
Modernization was an issue addressed more specifically in the post-9/11 period.  As 
an advocate for the reforms being proposed, Georgia Democratic Senator Zell Miller argued, 
“When it comes to choosing between an aged, arthritic civil service system filled with 
stumbling blocks and booby traps or an agile agency that is nimble, this American stands 
with my president,”123 referring to President Bush’s advocacy of reform measures. However, 
post-9/11 reform opponent John Gage argued that the reforms were regressive: “they are 
encouraging a management of coercion and intimidation. This is not a modern system. This is 
a step backward.”124  
Modernization of the civil service was a theme raised in both time periods. Reform 
advocates argued that the current system was outdated and needed to be replaced, and reform 
opponents argued that the proposed changes were a regression toward old systems that 
allowed managers too much authority.   
3. Flexibility 
The use of the key word flexibility was the prevailing descriptor used in the 
arguments for or against civil service reform. The term is used in the legislative language of 
                                                 
122 Stephen Barr, “Gore Reconsiders Project to ‘Reinvent’ Government; New Plan Would Retool Agencies One 
By One,” The Washington Post, 17 November 1996, A19.  
123 David Firestone, “Unlikely Power Broker on ‘Homeland’ Plan’s Fate,” New York Times, 19 September 
2002, A25. 
124 Christopher Lee, “Civil Service System on Way Out at DHS,” The Washington Post, 27 January 2005, A5.   
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 the HSA and was a focal point of the arguments in both time periods. Partly at issue was the 
definition and implications of the term “flexibility.” Reform advocates argued that managers 
needed to have flexibility to hire, pay, and manage civil service employees. For example, 
Alvin S. Felzenberg, Virginia L. Thomas and Robert E. Moffit of the Heritage foundation 
argued that major civil service reform was needed “to improve flexibility in staffing the civil 
service, with an emphasis on changing the culture from one of bureaucratic tenure to high-
performing public service and establishing new pay and benefits packages that are flexible, 
generous and portable.”125 However, reform opponents argued that such flexibilities eroded 
the employees’ rights. For example, Harnage said: 
If statutory protections are eliminated in order to make aspects of federal 
compensation “flexible” in the sense of being susceptible to change implemented 
unilaterally by management, the absence of collective bargaining rights would 
deprive federal workers of any democratic process through which to make our voices 
heard. An expansion in collective bargaining rights, then, would be a necessary 
component of any expansion in management rights.126
Post-9/11 reform advocates continued to argue the necessity of management 
flexibilities. For example, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said that the president “has 
made it very clear” that he would not endorse any legislation that “doesn’t adequately protect 
the country with the flexibility that the work force needs to do their job well.”127 However, 
Joseph Lieberman—an advocate of certain civil service reforms who nonetheless took issue 
with the some of the reforms being proposed by the Bush administration—also challenged 
the need for the proposed flexibilities: “if granted, the president’s pleas for additional 
                                                 
125 Stephen Barr, “When It Comes to Civil Service, Everybody Has an Opinion: Change It,” The Washington 
Post, 18 March 18, C02. 
126 Bobby L. Harnage, “Expanding Flexible Personnel Systems Governmentwide,” testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and the District of Columbia, Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 17 July 2001.  
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 ‘flexibility’ would give his administration unprecedented power to undercut the civil service 
system, rewrite laws by fiat and spend taxpayers’ money without congressional checks and 
balances.”128  
The argument about management flexibilities was present in both time periods. Bush 
reform advocates argued that such flexibilities were necessary to transform the civil service 
system. Bush reform opponents argued that the particular flexibilities being sought would 
undercut employee rights and give too much power to management and the Executive 
branch.  
4. Accountability 
The theme of employee accountability was another argument evident in both time 
periods. During a campaign speech in the pre-9/11 time period, then Texas Governor George 
W. Bush argued for need for civil service reform: “With a system of rewards and 
accountability, we can promote a culture of achievement throughout the Federal 
government.”129 Whereas the specific issue of accountability was not as evident in public 
remarks by reform opponents prior to 9/11, unions have traditionally argued that such 
accountabilities were already part of the current system. The issue of accountability was 
raised explicitly post-9/11, by both reform advocates and opponents. For example, during 
hearings in the United States Senate’s Governmental Affairs Committee, Senator Fred 
Thompson, ranking Republican member stated, “Homeland security is too important not to 
                                                 
128 Barbara L. Schwemle, Homeland Security: Human Resources Management. RL31500, (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, 5 September 2002).  
129 Stephen Barr, “Don’t Worry about the Job Cuts in Bush’s Plan, Adviser Says: Think Hefty Bonuses,” The 
Washington Post, 12 June 2000, B02.  
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 have a high-performance, accountable workforce.”130 However, current AFGE president John 
Gage challenged the implication that the current system didn’t hold employees accountable: 
“Unacceptable performers are fired. It’s not factual that poor performers are allowed to 
languish in jobs that could be held by better performers.”131
Employee accountability was an issue addressed by both sides in the debate: reform 
advocates argued that the need for accountability demanded an overhaul of the system, while 
opponents argued that the current system already provided such accountabilities.  
5. Broadbanding and Paybanding 
Broadbanding and Paybanding were introduced as alternatives to the General 
Schedule (GS) system both before and after 9/11. Broadbanding refers to the grouping of GS 
grade levels into fewer, broader levels of work with wider salary ranges. Usually a limited 
number of occupational families are identified and a set of ranges or bands is tailored for 
each family.132 The pre-9/11 proponents of broadbanding argued that the new process would 
allow government more flexibility to hire and retain better federal workers. For example, 
Myra Shiplett, Director of the Center for Human Resources Management at the National 
Academy of Public Administration, advocated for the program: “The [broadbanding] 
approach has been extensively monitored and evaluated by the US Office of Personnel 
Management, which has reported in numerous studies over the last two decades that the 
laboratories have been able to recruit and retain quality employees at higher rates than the 
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 traditional system.”133  This point emphasized the need to use broadbanding/paybanding as a 
means to improve the government workforce. Although the broadbanding/paybanding issue 
was not as prevalent in the popular press pre-9/11, there was some evidence of the 
opponents’ position on the issue. For example, an issue paper from the AFGE Local 2113 
web site noted: 
‘Pay Banding’ is an experimental pay system different from the GS-series pay system 
in that an employee receives raises in accordance with his performance evaluations as 
determined by his supervisor. While at first this may seem attractive, assuming a top 
performer will enjoy accelerated pay promotion, the entire process is subjective and 
has disadvantages. 134
In the post-9/11 time period, David Walker, US Comptroller General, stated there is a 
need for greater flexibilities such as broadbanding. Drawing on a recent OPM whitepaper 
released by Kay Coles James, Walker asserted: 
the greater use of broadbanding is one of the options that deserve to be discussed. In 
the short term, Congress may wish to explore the benefits of providing OPM with 
additional flexibility that would enable it to grant government-wide authority for all 
agencies to use broadbanding for certain critical occupations and/or allowing agencies 
to apply to OPM for broadbanding authority for their specific critical occupations.”135
However, the post-9/11 opponents disagreed that paybanding/broadbanding was an effective 
system. NTEU’s Colleen Kelly argued that the system was unproven as an effective measure: 
“It is a mystery to me where the evidence is that these systems [paybanding/broadbanding] 
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 have produced successes to justify putting them in place throughout the federal 
government.”136
The concept of broadbanding and paybanding was an argument in which both 
proponents and opponents engaged, both before and after 9/11. Proponents argued that such a 
system would improve recruiting and retention of federal employees, whereas opponents 
argued that the system was overly subjective and did not have a strong enough history of 
success to warrant implementation into the federal government. 
6. Performance-based Pay  
Broadbanding/paybanding facilitated another attempt at performance-based pay. This 
new compensation concept replaced the traditional longevity-based step increase system with 
yearly performance-based pay raises. Advocates argued that this would make the federal 
workers more efficient and would improve the work place. For example, pre-9/11, Bush 
campaigned on this issue and noted his support for pay-for-performance systems:   
We must have a government that thinks differently, so we need to recruit talented and 
imaginative people to public service. We can do this by reforming civil service with a 
few simple measures. We'll establish a meaningful system to measure performance. 
Create awards for employees who surpass expectations. Tie pay increases to results. 
With a system of rewards and accountability, we can promote a culture of 
achievement throughout the Federal government.137  
This argument emphasizes the belief that a new system of rewarding performance 
will increase the productivity of the federal workers. The pre-9/11 opponents, however, 
contended that the new pay-for-performance systems would undermine performance. For 
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 example, prior to 9/11, in a hearing before the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, 
Harnage argued that such systems pit employees against each other:  
One of the main ideas behind this “flexible” pay-setting system was to foster 
teamwork and improve performance. However, with its overemphasis on the 
contribution “scores” of individuals, and its “best to worst” ranking of employee 
performance, [a pay-for-performance system] crudely pits one employee against 
another for a finite amount of money. One co-worker’s loss is another’s gain—and an 
“each man for himself” environment is created. 138  
Post-9/11, Kay Coles James argued the merits of the proposed pay-for-performance 
system: “First, the Government needs to convey to its employees an unequivocal message 
that performance matters. Second, linking pay to performance will focus agency and 
employee attention on performance management.”139 In addition to the teamwork problem 
noted pre-9/11, reform opponents post-9/11 argued that the new system would give too much 
power to managers to determine pay. For example, AFGE argued: 
The merit system principles include prohibitions on political favoritism in and 
discrimination in hiring and firing, pay based on market data and job duties, not 
favoritism […] None of these principles can be effectively enforced or upheld when 
political appointees and the managers who answer to them are given unchecked 
authority to hire, fire, set pay, award contracts, and prohibit workers from seeking 
union representation through collective bargaining.140   
Pay-for-performance was an argument that appeared in both time periods. Advocates 
argued that the new system would reward performance and, thus, motivate and retain good 
government employees. Opponents argued that the new system would compromise teamwork 
and encourage favoritism. 
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 7. Recruitment and Retention 
Numerous sources, on both sides of the debate, expressed concern about the ability to 
recruit and retain high-quality and top-performing government employees. This concern was 
due, in part, to the looming retirement of many current workers. Reform proponents argued 
that retention was difficult without a better system to link pay with performance. 
Additionally, reform proponents argued that the current process takes too long to hire 
critically needed personnel, which in their view impacted the ability to hire top candidates. 
For example, John M. Palguta, Director of Policy and Evaluation at the Merit Systems 
Protection Board (MSPB) wrote that the government “is severely limited in its ability to 
compete for highly qualified candidates in at least some occupations and geographic areas.” 
He argued that government needs to adopt a personnel strategy that “deals with . . . 
ineffective or outdated recruitment strategies, and the lack of a coherent approach to 
employee selection and hiring that leaves applicants and would-be applicants baffled and 
frustrated.”141 Although reform opponents agreed that there were problems with recruiting 
and retention, they attributed the problems to different factors. For example, Harnage argued 
that the government trend towards contracting work to non-federal workers created pay-
equity concerns and fears of job loss by current and future government workers: 
the government needs to provide federal employees with compensation that is 
comparable to and competitive with that paid by other large private- and public-sector 
employers, eliminate arbitrary Full Time Equivalent (FTE) ceilings and hire 
according to agency mission needs, and end the practice of contracting out all new 
federal work and privatizing work that has been performed efficiently and 
competently by skilled and dedicated public employees.142
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 The arguments are similar in the post-9/11 time period. For example, in the 
November 2001 Issues of Merit, the MSPB highlighted some of the problems it saw with the 
“rule of three,” which requires the selection of one of the top three eligible hires. One such 
problem the report cited was the way ties are broken in the current system: “if there are more 
than three candidates tied for the highest score, tie breakers must be used to get down to only 
three. Random selection based on social security number is usually used in such cases. This 
is hardly an example of sound merit-based selection, and it’s difficult to argue that it gives 
managers truly meaningful choices.”143 Reform opponents argued that the issues affecting 
recruitment and retention could be addressed within the current system. For example, the 
AFGE argued that providing employees adequate compensation was key: “by ensuring that 
federal employees are treated and compensated fairly, unions can help agencies address 
recruitment and retention problems.”144
Recruitment and retention were issues of concern for both sides of debate in both time 
periods. Reform proponents argued that current system had outmoded hiring and retention 
strategies, preventing the ability to recruit and retain top candidates. Reform opponents 
argued that the biggest barriers to recruitment and retention were the trend toward 
contracting and lagging compensation for federal workers. 
8. Union Busting 
The concept of union busting became more prevalent in the post-9/11 period, but 
there was some evidence of the argument pre-9/11 as well. This argument was made 
primarily by reform opponents. For example, a 1998 reform proposal included a provision to 
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 restrict “official time” spent on union activities. Harnage called this particular reform 
measure an attempt to “put us [unions] out of business.”145 We could find no public response 
to the union-busting claim specifically by reform advocates in the pre-9/11 period.  
In the post-9/11 time period, reform advocates more openly refuted the charge that 
their reform measures amounted to union busting. For example, Kay Coles James asserted 
that “while the administration is seeking some civil service reforms, contrary to AFGE 
assertions, major issues such as collective bargaining rights are actually enhanced by the 
legislation passed by the House. That legislation guarantees those rights when employees are 
transferred to DHS.”146  However, reform opponents argued the administration was 
attempting to compromise union power. Gage, for example, argued that the need to bypass 
unions for the sake of national security was “disingenuous,” and merely an excuse to 
“remove employee’s rights.” 147  A Washington Post editorial asserted a similar sentiment: “it 
would be nice to believe the administration’s fervent denials of a plot to destroy the mostly 
Democratic unions. But before we do, we’d like to see some clearer arguments from the 
administration about what the elimination of union bargaining has to do with either the 
nation’s safety or civil service performance.” 148
Union busting was an argument evident in both time periods. Reform opponents 
charged that many of the personnel provisions in the reform efforts were aimed at destroying 
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 or undercutting union power. Reform advocates rebutted this claim and argued that union 
protections would remain intact—even enhanced—under the new system.   
9. The Party Line: Democrats vs. Republicans 
Throughout the debate in both time periods, reform advocates and reform opponents 
argued that reform proposals were adopted or defeated along party lines. For example, pre-
9/11 there was a Republican bill introduced in the House for reforms that would have created 
performance-based compensation and an easier termination policy for removing poor 
performers. In response, Rep. Elijah Cummings (D-MD), offered a Democratic counter 
proposal; neither side was happy with the others’ proposal, and the support for each version 
was drawn primarily along party lines. Despite efforts at compromise, Rep. Dan Mica (R-Fl), 
the sponsor of the Republican bill, was quoted as having claimed that “Cummings proposal 
represented a total dismemberment of the original bill. It’s sort of the meat of our proposal, 
and they [Democrats] oppose just about all of it.”149 For his part, Cummings argued that they 
[Democrats] would “continue […] in a bipartisan way to bring about positive change for the 
federal workforce, but many provisions remain in the [Republican] proposal that I, the 
administration, and/or the employee organizations oppose.”150  
Post-9/11, arguments along party lines were more explicit and pronounced. Reform 
advocates argued that Democrats were choosing union support over the needs of national 
security. For example, Republican Senate Leader Trent Lott asserted, “The homeland 
security department is being blocked by Senate Democrats who are determined to protect the 
interests of their union bosses in the bureaucracy.”151  Reform opponents, however, charged 
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 that Republicans were putting too much power in the hands of managers:  Senator Tom 
Daschle called the Republican bill a “power grab of unprecedented magnitude” over civil 
service rights.152   
The arguments were made along party lines.  Democrats generally took on the union 
position, supporting fewer or more moderate reforms, and Republicans generally took the 
position advocating sweeping reforms. This party cleavage was evident in both time periods.  
Civil service reform, both before and after 9/11, cannot be so neatly divided along party 
lines, of course. For instance, presidents of both parties have proposed reform. Nevertheless, 
the partisan challenges played a role in the debate, both before and after 9/11.  
10.  National Security 
The final theme involves the argument of national security as a rationale for civil 
service reform. Consistent with the claims made by several people involved in the post-9/11 
reform effort, the key difference in the arguments for personnel management reform post-
9/11 was in the link made between national security needs and management flexibilities. 
Based on our literature review, we could find no arguments, pre-9/11, which asserted such a 
connection. Post 9/11, however, the national security argument was prevalent throughout the 
debate. For example, in a Brookings Forum that explained the White House plan for reform, 
Richard Falkenrath argued the importance of homeland security and the subsequent need to 
have management flexibility in the Department:  “no goal is higher or more important than 
the Department of Homeland Security, and to secure the homeland we need this flexibility. 
So, that’s why we’re adopting this department-specific flexibility.”153 Reform opponents, 
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 however, took issue with the claim that federal employees, under the current system, 
compromised the needs of national security. For example, Harnage argued that the proposed 
reforms robbed employees of their rights, which created an insecure workforce that 
compromised national security:   “When public employees’ rights and protections are 
compromised, so too is the safety and security of the public they serve. [...] Homeland 
security requires a secure work force with employees who can be certain that they, too, will 
be protected from politics and favoritism and from punishment for speaking out against any 
mismanagement they witness.”154  
We were drawn to investigate this argument in more detail. Specifically, we were 
interested in examining more closely the potential persuasive effect of the national security 
argument, as it appeared to be the pivotal issue on which the fate of personnel management 
reform seemed to depend.  Was it true, as James Lewis from the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies argued, that discussions of national security may have made opposition 
more difficult? In his words, he asserted, “Neither party is going to want to get caught with 
the other one saying, ‘Look, they’re obstructing homeland security.’That’s where they’re not 
going to be as willing to question or criticize as much as they would otherwise.”155  
Lewis illustrates the key issue of contention that would indeed prove to be critical in 
the passage of the personnel management reforms as part of DHS. 
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 D.  Conclusion 
In this chapter, we carefully examined arguments for and against civil service 
reforms, both prior to and following 9/11. Specifically, we provided evidence of nine 
arguments that were present in both time periods: (1) Strategic Human Capital Management, 
(2) Modernization, (3) Flexibility, (4) Accountability, (5) Broadbanding and Paybanding, (6) 
Pay-for-Performance, (7) Recruitment and Retention, (8) Union Busting, and (9) The Party 
Line: Democrats vs. Republicans. The final argument, (10) National Security, was the only 
argument found to be unique in the post-9/11 period. This finding provided us with the 
impetus to examine the national security argument in more detail.  
Interestingly, many of the arguments that existed prior to 9/11 were resurrected with 
new force in light of national security concerns. For example, while the need for management 
flexibility has always been a cornerstone argument for reform proponents, the rationale of 
doing whatever was necessary to secure the nation provided additional rhetorical emphasis 
that would prove to be highly persuasive. In the next chapter, we examine the rhetorical 
implications of the national security argument in detail. This analysis helps to explain why 
reform associated with HSA succeeded while other, previous reforms failed.
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 V.  National Security: A Rhetorical Analysis 
A.  Introduction 
Our analysis of the publicly available data suggests that an argument linking 
personnel management reforms and the needs of national security was unique in the post-
9/11 era compared with the arguments of pre-9/11 reform attempts. Consequently, this 
argument was plausibly a key factor in the passage of the civil service provisions in the 
Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002. Several key people involved in the HSA legislation 
also asserted a strong connection between the events of 9/11 and enactment of personnel 
management reforms. For example, John Gartland, Director of Legislative Affairs at OPM 
said “It never would have passed. […] Without 9/11, this [reform] would never have seen the 
light of day.”156 So, how, specifically, did personnel management reform become dependent 
on national security? In this chapter, we explore the argument in detail, examining the 
rhetorical force of the national security argument.  
B.  Analysis of the National Security Argument: Method 
One effective approach for analyzing arguments and their potential effect is to 
examine the metaphors embedded within them. Far from being mere ornament, metaphors 
structure how people think in that they invite audiences to view persons, places and situations 
in particular ways.157  Robert L. Ivie, in his article “Metaphor and the Rhetorical Invention of 
Cold War ‘Idealists,” provides a useful approach for examining the persuasive and rhetorical 
effect of metaphors. According to Ivie, metaphor provides a key for understanding rhetorical 
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 invention, whereby an image conveyed in an argument “produces an […] interpretation of 
reality, with which the intended audience is invited to identify.”158 Through metaphor 
analysis, we can gain insights into how arguments may invoke particular audience responses 
and, consequently, we can better understand some of the persuasive characteristics that may 
have impacted the successful outcome of the legislation.  
Ivie describes a general process for identifying key metaphors. First, an analyst needs 
to be familiar with the text and context within the topic of interest. We gained this familiarity 
through interviews, research, and the analysis conducted in chapter three. Second, the analyst 
performs several close readings of the selected materials to identify and extract the 
metaphors employed by the speaker. Third, the analyst subdivides similar metaphors into 
themes, which are then classified as “metaphorical concepts.”  Finally, each metaphor is 
examined within each theme to identify patterns of usage.159  
In political discourse, the use of language and metaphor can influence the receivers of 
the message, possibly influencing how people vote or adopt a position on a particular issue. 
George Lakoff has written recently on the relationship between metaphor and politics, 
arguing that metaphors affect unconscious reasoning and inference making.160 We argue in 
this study that underlying metaphors, within the arguments from reform advocates and 
opponents, played a role in shaping public opinion, thus clearing the way for reform 
legislation that had repeatedly failed prior to 9/11.   
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 C. Findings 
1. Representing each side in the debate: Collective “Agents” 
Upon our review of the data, we saw a pattern emerge as to how both sides in the 
controversy were constructed in the arguments. Although there were many quotes from 
different spokespersons on each side, the collective perspectives gave rise to what we term as 
two representative agents for each side, one representing reform advocates and one 
representing reform opponents. The reform advocate agent, for example, included 
perspectives expressed by President George W. Bush and his administration, various 
representatives of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB), and others who argued for an overhaul of the existing personnel 
management system. On the other side, the reform opponent agent included perspectives 
expressed by union leaders, many legislators who supported the union position and others 
who opposed the sweeping reform measures being proposed by the Bush administration. The 
multiple perspectives, within each side of the debate, shared similarities such that a unified 
agent for that perspective emerged as the embodiment of a position either for or against 
personnel management reform. Our analysis revealed two distinct agents being invoked 
which we label as follows: The Administration Agent (the advocates of reform) and the 
Union Agent (the opponents of reform).  
The Administration Agent (hereafter referred to as “Administration”) is the proponent 
for civil service reform. This agent is constructed as one who expressed concern with 
national security and the protection of the American people against an external foe.  By 
establishing the objects of its protection—the American people—the Administration assumes 
and establishes the credibility and authority to act and speak on their behalf.   
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 The Union Agent (hereafter referred to as “Union”) is the opponent of sweeping civil 
service reform.161 This agent is constructed as one who is concerned with the protection of 
federal workers against an internal foe, one who would compromise workers’ rights and 
freedoms in service to fighting a war. By establishing the objects of its protection—primarily 
unionized federal workers affected by the proposed changes—the Union assumes and 
establishes the credibility and authority to act on their behalf.  
The utility of collapsing each side’s views into a representative agent is that it 
provides a collective representation of the primary opposing arguments. While we don’t 
dismiss the nuances and differences between members on the same side as unimportant, the 
audiences of this debate as a whole likely conceived of the arguments in broader terms. It is 
against that backdrop of the debate, broadly conceived, that we direct our focus in this study. 
Given the establishment of these two agents, we now turn to our analysis of metaphors to 
examine the rhetorical force of the national security argument. 
2. Metaphor Analysis 
Within our corpus of data, several metaphoric themes emerged among the arguments 
presented. Those metaphors were evident in three primary issues relevant to this debate: 
strategy, protection, and power. Within each of these key issues, we drew on metaphoric 
references and compared the perspectives of the two competing agents for insights into the 
potential impact on the audiences of the arguments. First, we examined the issue of 
“strategy,” that is, how each side characterized its efforts toward an ultimate goal. Second, 
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 we examined the issue of “protection,” in which each side identifies both the method for and 
the object of its protection. Third, we explored the issue of “power” and how each side 
expressed and conceptualized its power relative to each other and national security. These 
three issues—strategy, protection, and power—were arguably key for Americans in the post-
9/11 world. Furthermore, each side in the debate addressed these issues, and a comparison of 
their differences was useful in assessing the effectiveness of the arguments.  
Throughout the following analysis, we use italics to highlight particular words or 
phrases that were key in our interpretation of the data. Therefore, all use of italics should be 
considered our emphasis rather than the original authors’ unless otherwise noted.  
a. Strategy 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines strategy as “a plan for successful action based 
on the rationality and interdependence of the moves of the opposing participants.”162 A 
strategy or plan implies intent on the part of the entity engaging in it, but strategies are often 
implicitly rather than explicitly stated. In the data we examined, each agent exhibited its own 
strategy, underlain with metaphors that supported its own and refuted the other’s strategic 
intentions.  How these strategic intentions are expressed, and the principles they illustrate, 
can provide insight into responses by audiences—that is, which strategies the audience may 
judge as rational and in their best interest.  So, it is important to look at both the strategies 
that were expressed by each agent in the controversy, as well as the metaphors they drew 
upon to convey their strategic perspectives and rationales.  
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 The Administration presents their strategy as one that requires them to have more 
control over federal personnel in order to provide national security and protect America. For 
example, President Bush argued that he needed the freedom “to put the right people at the 
right place at the right time to protect the American people.”163 The metaphor of physical 
placement—to “put” federal workers in particular places at particular times—is rationalized 
as a strategy to protect America, much like one would move a Bishop or Knight in a chess 
game to protect the King. This physical placement metaphor was also picked up by the news 
media. In one summary of the issues, an article in the Washington Post noted, “The White 
House wants to retain the ability to remove some employees from unions for national security 
reasons,” and “Bush wants the ability to move workers from one part of the department to 
another to meet rapidly changing needs.164 This metaphor of physical placement suggests that 
the Administration requires a particularly high degree of power and control over personnel, 
but that degree of power is presented as rational and justified in light of national security. To 
the extent that the audience is concerned about national security, then they are invited to see 
the Administration strategy—in this case, its need for power over personnel—as one that is 
consistent with that concern.  
The Union critiqued the Administration’s strategy in several ways. First, the Union 
asserted that the Administration’s strategy was disingenuous. The Administration argued for 
the need to bypass union protections in order to place, move, or remove federal personnel 
where they were needed for national security purposes. The Union asserted that the 
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 Administration was instead anti-union, a claim they argued using metaphors of destruction 
and elimination. For example, John Gage, current AFGE president, questioned the 
connection drawn between union rights—including the right to control where personnel are 
placed—and national security; In a Washington Post editorial, Gage was quoted as asserting 
that such claims were “disingenuous.” The editorial went on to echo some of Gage’s 
concerns, noting, “It would be nice to believe the administration’s fervent denials of a plot to 
destroy the mostly Democratic unions. But before we do, we’d like to see some clearer 
arguments from the administration about what the elimination of union bargaining has to do 
with either the nation’s safety or civil service performance.”165 In another example from 
AFGE Talking Points, the Union asserted that the Administration’s strategy represents 
“longstanding efforts to bust federal employee unions.”166 Bobby Harnage also critiqued the 
Administration’s strategy using similar metaphors: “Destroying the rights of federal 
employees will, in turn, destroy any attempt to provide skilled, well-trained, professional 
employees to guard our nation and its citizens.”167 The Union asserted that the Administration 
was destroying the rights of the workers and, thus, positioned the Administration’s strategy 
as negative and destructive. These examples illustrate the Union’s perspective that the 
Administration strategy will destroy and eliminate the rights of workers, a move that will 
harm national security. 
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 In addition to arguing that the Union position helps rather than hinders national 
security, the Union also argued that the Administration’s claims about national security 
interests were a tactic to gain compliance for controversial personnel reforms. The Union 
charged the Administration with premeditation and drew on a metaphor of perseverance in 
arguing this claim. For example, Rhode Island Senator Chaffee, a Republican who sided with 
the Union in the controversy, stated, “the President and his allies knew exactly what they 
were doing in holding out on this issue.” 168 A writer for The New York Times noted that 
“Many members of Congress from both parties now say that the Administration was 
politically clever in inserting the personnel requirements, foreseeing an opposition from the 
Democrats and an opportunity to defeat them in the face of national security.”169  To “hold 
out” on an issue and to be “politically clever” implies conscious intent; as a critique of the 
Administration’s strategy, it illustrates the Union argument that the Administration was 
consciously strategic in their use of the national security argument and “knew exactly what 
they were doing.”170  
Implied within their critique of the Administration’s strategy, however, is the Union’s 
own strategy to preserve workers’ rights to organize, to bargain, and to be heard. Underlying 
this strategic perspective is a battle metaphor which suggests that federal workers are already 
engaged in the war on terror. For example, Harnage said that the “fight against terrorism, in 
which federal employees have always been on the front lines of the homeland, is about 
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 preserving our freedoms—including our right to organize—not destroying them.”171 Colleen 
Kelly, president of the NTEU, also asserted that it is important to have “frontline employees 
with a real voice in how the work gets done.”172 In these examples, the Union drew upon a 
metaphor that suggests that employees are already in a position to support national security, 
and this metaphoric depiction challenges the physical placement needs espoused by the 
Administration.  
So, here we have two strategies, from each side in the debate, both of which are 
supported by potentially powerful metaphors. Each side presents their strategy as right, just, 
and in service to what is critical and important. However, there are some key differences 
between the two positions that could potentially affect audience response. One key difference 
is the object of protection. In the case of the Administration, the focus of protection is the 
“American people.” In the case of the Union, the primary focus of protection is a subset of 
the American people, the federal workers.  So, while the Administration expressed a need to 
physically place the federal worker, the power they seek is expressed as a means to protect 
the larger group of Americans; that is, all Americans. The Union uses powerful metaphors to 
describe the problems with that power—destruction of the Union and the rights it affords 
workers, challenges of disingenuineness, and powerful depictions of federal workers as 
already on the frontline of the national security battle—but ultimately their strategy is 
directed at a subset of Americans. Thus, the various audiences being addressed may see their 
interests being more directly served by the Administration’s strategy than by the Union 
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 strategy.  To put it another way, in a post-9/11 world, audiences might simply be more 
moved to accept various strategies in service to their own safety versus the protection of 
workers’ rights. Similarly, an audience might not be moved by critiques of the 
Administration’s strategy, even if the critiques were credible, if they did not view the 
Union’s purported objective as more important than the Administration’s purported 
objective.   
The issue of protection—that is, defining the objects of protection and who needs 
what kind of power to ensure it—is a critical issue in this debate. In the next section, we 
explore this issue in more detail.  
b. Protection   
9/11 generated a great deal of fear in the American public, an emotional 
preoccupation that was clearly an issue for HSA and the personnel management reforms 
contained within it. A critical question in this debate was who or what needed to be 
protected. The Administration expressed its intention, need, and ability to protect the average 
American citizen. The Union expressed its intention, need, and ability to protect the federal 
worker.  
It is interesting to explore the ways that the Administration refers to the object of its 
protection. For example, the Administration consistently made references to “the American 
people,”173 a collective and inclusive reference that applies to everyone. Additionally, there 
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 were numerous references to “homeland,”174 including but not limited to references to the 
Department of Homeland Security. For example, Bush noted in a speech, “We’re doing 
everything we can to protect the homeland against an enemy that hates us.”175 Although there 
are many definitions of the term “home,” as a metaphor it may invoke its more common 
connotation of the physical and personal home in which one lives. As an object of the 
Administration’s protection, “homeland” simultaneously draws upon both the personal and 
national senses of that term; nonetheless, the personal connection invites the audience to 
view the object as valuable, for what is more valuable than one’s home and its inhabitants? 
Another reference to the object of protection is “you,” as expressed, for example, in a Bush 
speech in which he asserts the “Department [of Homeland Security]. . . is being created to 
secure you.” 176  In this case, he is not referring literally to an individual, but rather is drawing 
on “you” as a metaphor in addressing a collective. In doing so, he establishes a connection 
that invites the audience to identify with the object of protection as he describes it; it is not an 
abstract entity, but rather you who are the object of concern.   
The Union, in contrast to the Administration, depicts the object of protection as 
primarily the federal worker and only secondarily the American public. Consider these 
comments from Harnage: “When public employees’ rights and protections are compromised, 
so too is the safety and security of the public they serve. […] Homeland security requires a 
secure work force. […] Destroying the rights of federal employees will, in turn, destroy any 
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 attempt to provide skilled, well-trained, professional employees to guard our nation and its 
citizens.”177  In these examples, the federal employees are foregrounded as needing protection 
so that they, in turn, can protect the public. The protection they need draws upon the concept 
of security, but primarily in the sense of the federal employee’s own personal security rather 
than the security of the homeland per se. The reference to personal security involves 
protecting (rather than destroying) their rights as workers. Once the Union ensures protection 
for workers’ rights, only then will those employees be able to “guard our nation and its 
citizens.”   
In addition to foregrounding federal workers as the primary object of protection, the 
Union also depicts the public—the secondary object of protection—differently than does the 
Administration. For example, in the Harnage quote above, he referred to “the public” and 
“our nation and its citizens.” As compared with the “American people,” the reference to “the 
public” is abstract and does not draw upon the same connection with the audience. 
Additionally, this reference to “the public” is couched within a reference to the primary 
object, the federal employee, in that it is not simply the public, but rather “the public they 
serve.”  Again, then, the federal employee is still prevalent and connected to concerns 
involving the larger populace. The second term of reference, “our nation and its citizens,” is 
also somewhat abstract compared with references by the Administration. While “our nation” 
creates some personal connection, the reference to “its citizens” reintroduces an abstract tone. 
In contrast to the directness of the term “you” as used by the Administration, “our nation and 
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 its citizens” asks the audience to place themselves within the third person reference rather 
than as a direct respondent of the message.  
In speculating the persuasive effect of how each side in the debate dealt with the key 
issue of protection, we closely examined how each side depicted the objects of that 
protection. The Administration cast a wide net that encompassed all the American people, 
while the Union expressed their primary concern as protecting federal employees, a move 
that they presented as a necessary first step to protecting the public. Additionally, the 
Administration drew upon metaphors and concepts that emphasized connection, whereas the 
Union drew upon concepts that were more abstract. The audience, therefore, may have been 
drawn to the Administration argument because they were invited to see themselves and their 
interests as being served more directly.  
c. Power 
Each agent in the controversy expressed an intention, need and ability to offer 
protection for its respective objects of primary concern. The ability to protect, however, 
necessitates that the agent possess the power to carry out the actions they see as necessary to 
provide that protection. Both agents in this debate expressed conceptions of its respective 
power, but each did so in different ways.  
One key difference was in how they each portrayed the holder of power. In the case 
of the Administration, such holders were primarily emphasized as individuals or second 
person references to groups of people. For example, the Administration argued that “a time 
of war is the wrong time to weaken the president’s ability to protect the American people,”178 
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 and “I don't think you’ll ever be able to say that you’ve done all you can do to enhance 
security of this country if you don’t give a new secretary […] flexibility.”179 In numerous 
other instances, Bush relied on the use of personal pronouns: “I need to have the ability to put 
the right people at the right place at the right time;”180 “I would have the capacity […] to 
suspend those rules;”181 and “I need the flexibility to be able to look at the American people 
and say we’re doing everything we can to protect the homeland against an enemy that hates 
us.”182 In all these cases, the holder of power is an identifiable entity, one who can be held 
accountable—at least through identification—for the power and subsequent actions the agent 
takes.  The Union, however, portrays the holder of power primarily as a system or abstract 
collectivities. For example, “the merit system” is held up as an entity which can ensure 
“protection for whistleblowers who alert Congress and the public to fraud, abuse, 
mismanagement, and threats to national security.”183 In other examples, systemic 
collectivities are emphasized as the holders of power: “Federal employee unions have 
formally represented the vast majority of the federal workforce for forty years. Union 
membership has never been inconsistent with national security,”184 and “[one of] the most 
important things needed to improve homeland security [is] frontline employees with a real 
voice in how the work gets done.”185 In these examples, the holders of power are union 
leadership and union membership, systemic collectives that are not as easily identifiable and, 
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 thus, do not carry the same perception or degree of direct accountability. From the 
perspective of the audience, it is plausible that the Administration’s call for more power, in 
service to protecting the American people against threats to national security, was persuasive 
because of the direct relationship being drawn between the threat and who, specifically, was 
taking action to combat that threat. In the case of the Union, their portrayal of the entity that 
holds the power added another level of abstraction. As we saw previously, the first level of 
abstraction was that the object of protection was primarily the federal worker, a subset of the 
American people. Now, the second layer of abstraction is introduced: the holder of power 
portrayed by the Union is a system or collective that is taking responsibility for providing 
national security—a characterization that introduces a diffused entity and, therefore, only 
indirect accountability.  
In addition to differences between depictions of the holders of power, each side also 
deals differently with how it characterizes its actions on behalf of national security. The 
Administration draws on action metaphors to describe and rationalize their need for power. 
For example, the Administration argued for personnel management changes so that it could 
“create a modern, flexible, and responsive program,”186 “put the right people at the right 
place,”187 and “run this department.”188 The Administration also repeatedly linked its actions 
directly to the needs of national security or the American people. Consider these examples: “I 
would have the capacity, for the sake of national security, to suspend collective bargaining 
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 rules,”189 and to “retain the ability to remove some employees from unions for national 
security reasons,”190 and finally “I will not accept a lousy bill that makes it impossible for the 
president […] to do what the American people expect, and that’s to protect the homeland.” In 
all of these examples, the Administration portrays its efforts in active terms, often linking 
those actions directly to the protection of the American people and the needs of national 
security.  
The Union also describes its actions drawing on active verbs, but often in service to 
the federal employee or the union rather than the American people. Additionally, when 
national security is addressed, it is often done so secondarily. For example, AFGE talking 
points argued, “Federal employee unions have formally represented the vast majority of the 
federal workforce for forty years. Union membership has never been inconsistent with 
national security.”191 In this case, the act of formal representation is an active move, but it is 
taken on behalf of the federal workforce. Additionally, the link provided between the actions 
of the federal workforce and ensuring national security is more passive than active. That is, 
rather than characterizing the federal employees as directly impacting national security, in 
this instance their actions are such that they are not “inconsistent” with efforts to ensure 
national security. This lack of direct connection between actions and national security 
concerns is evident in this example as well: “Federal employee unions have helped to keep 
the homeland secure.”192 While “help” is an action, it is a much weaker action when 
compared with the Administration’s efforts to “create” and “run” a department or “do what 
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 the American people expect” in service to national security. Importantly, there are instances 
in which the Union describes stronger actions. For example, consider the connotations of the 
metaphor “stand up” in this instance: “No one who stands up for the rights of collective 
bargaining should have their patriotism questioned.” 193 However, here again, the strong 
action is associated not directly with national security, but rather with a worker’s right to 
collective bargaining. The issue of collective bargaining is presented here as separate from 
one’s commitment to the nation. Though such a distinction may be credible, the power of the 
Union agent and its associated actions is still more directed toward protecting the federal 
employee than national security or the American people.   
Finally, in addition to the difference between the Administration’s relatively strong 
actions and the Union’s relatively weak or potentially self-serving actions, each critiqued the 
other in ways that served to bolster these initial characterizations. Bush, for example, argued 
that those who opposed management reforms wanted legislation that “strips me of 
authority,”194 and wanted him “to forfeit power.”195  Bush also argued that “A time of war is 
the wrong time to weaken the president’s ability to protect the American people,”196 and that 
he wouldn’t accept legislation that “that limits or weakens the president’s well-established 
authorities.”197 These critiques by the Administration do two things: first, they cast the 
opposition as making unreasonable demands that would compromise national security, and 
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 second, they reestablish the Administration’s strong power position. By drawing on 
metaphors of removal, forfeiture, and weakness as so clearly damaging to the power 
necessary to protect the nation, the Administration effectively bolsters its own argument that 
it needs the power it seeks and should rightly retain the power it already possesses.  
The Union also offered its own critiques of the Administration’s actions. Their 
harshest criticisms, as defenses against the power sought by the Administration, actually 
served to reestablish Administration authority, even as the Union was fighting against it. For 
example, the Union argued that “We see the administration’s use of ‘flexibility’ as a code 
word for denial of due process to federal employees,”198 and that “merely because an 
employee performs work related to homeland security should not automatically mean that his 
union membership should be outlawed.”199 In each of these cases, the Union implicitly 
acknowledges the power of the Administration to, in one case, “deny” due process, and in 
another case, to “outlaw” union membership. The empirical reality of these executive powers 
aside, the discourse directs the attention back to the primary power holder—the power holder 
who has repeatedly linked its actions with concerns about national security and the protection 
of the American people—as, in fact, already possessing some of the very power it seeks. In 
the old self-help mode of “acting as if” one is something as a route to actually becoming it, 
the Union critique in this instance actually serves to bolster the Administration argument and 
its need for (continued) power.  
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 D. Conclusion 
This analysis of how each side presented its perspective on strategy, protection and 
power helps to explain the rhetorical force and persuasive appeal of the arguments. The 
Administration emphasized deliberate, accountable actions that they needed to take to protect 
the American people against a threat to national security. The Union mounted a defense 
against the Administration’s arguments, emphasizing the need to protect the federal worker 
as a necessary prerequisite to any ability to provide true security for the nation. While each 
side presented strong metaphors to underscore their positions, ultimately the debate centered 
on the needs of the “American people” vs. the needs of the “federal worker.”  
It is our contention that audiences identified more directly with the Administration’s 
arguments than the Union’s arguments within the culture of fear following 9/11. So, beyond 
the existence of the tragedy itself, it was the communication which drew upon the tragedy—
in specific ways—that ultimately paved the way for the passage of controversial personnel 
management reforms. Although many of the same arguments had existed in personnel 
management debates prior to 9/11, the arguments took on new rhetorical force against the 
backdrop of national security fears. Additionally, the characterizations of the agents in the 
controversy were also rhetorically significant for audiences of this debate. Given the new 
rhetorical landscape, audiences were likely more persuaded by agents who exhibited strong, 
decisive, almost paternal action in the face of known and unknown threats to the “homeland.” 
Conversely, the Union’s arguments for worker protections, systemic remedies for problems, 
and solutions that depended on collective over individual action were not as effective as they 
had been in the past. Quite simply, the events of 9/11 changed the criteria by which the 
various positions in the personnel management debate were judged. Given those changes, the 
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 rhetorical force of the Administration’s arguments were pivotal in passing this legislation as 
part of the HSA.  
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 VI. Discussion 
A number of themes have been identified, and some important issues have been 
raised in this case history.  This chapter will explore some of those issues for their effects on 
the HSA and more broadly for their implications for DHS and future policy making. 
A. The Design and Drafting Process 
The process used by the White House to design the new DHS and draft the proposal 
that was presented to the Cabinet and sent to Congress was an exception to the norm.  The 
proposal was drafted in secret by a small staff group in the White House.  This group did not 
coordinate with the departments or agencies that would be affected by the proposal.  The 
initial language was general, and even the legislative language was drafted in broad strokes.  
A more normal legislative development process would have involved staffing and 
coordination with subject-matter experts throughout the Executive branch; careful drafting by 
legislative counsel; prior notification, coordination, and negotiation on Capitol Hill; and 
perhaps even consultation with interest groups. 
The White House staff group admittedly lacked expertise in matters of personnel 
management policy. As Bruce Lawlor said, “We could not have constructed the intricacies of 
a new personnel system.  We did not have the skill set to do that, so our design was to create 
as much flexibility as we could, so then we could bring it back and have the professionals 
finish the bill.”200  This lack of expertise was not lost on Colleen Kelly, who observed that, “It 
looked like it was being drafted at the White House by a very small group of people who 
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 were not really expert in this kind of law.”201  Ultimately, the process that characterized the 
drafting of this legislation had both advantages and disadvantages.  The importance and 
implications of drafting the proposal in secret and employing general language are discussed 
below. 
1. Secrecy 
The small White House staff group worked in secret in the Presidential Emergency 
Operations Center (PEOC).  Stung by the failure of an earlier attempt to coordinate a bill on 
border security throughout the government bureaucracy, the White House decided to draft 
the homeland security proposal without coordination with the cabinet departments.  In fact, 
most of the members of the Cabinet learned about the proposal, and its impact on their 
departments, only a day before its public release.  As Kay Cole James describes, “The phone 
rang about mid-day, asking that I come over to the White House at 6:00 pm. Then, Mark 
Everson laid out to me that he and several others had been involved in shaping this thing 
called the Department of Homeland Security, and it was going to be announced the following 
morning.”202  No time or opportunity existed for turf wars.   
This strategy proved successful in getting a proposal done in a timely manner.  Given 
the experience with the failed border protection agency, it is likely that this more expansive 
government reorganization would have encountered even more organizational hurdles.  
Conceivably, the same challenges may have existed for proposing changes to personnel 
management policy.  Although none of the White House staff members writing the proposal 
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 had particular expertise in personnel management, soliciting outside help may have slowed 
down the process considerably.  For example, if OPM had been brought into the process 
earlier, substantive expertise would have been added to the group; however, such a move 
may have carried the risk of getting bogged down in regulatory detail.   
Similarly, the group’s decision to act without consulting unions, employee 
associations, or key Capitol Hill committee staffs made the work of the G-5 easier and more 
expeditious.   Consultations would almost certainly have resulted in unwanted negotiations, 
compromises, and leaks.  But foregoing the input of interested parties also meant that their 
concerns went unaddressed—and consequently unanticipated—until the issue was in the 
public domain; therefore, debates took on a more strident and uncompromising tone.  Given 
the distrust the unions felt, secrecy served to increase their unease with the administration.   
2.  General Language 
Initially, the White House discussed “management flexibility” in only a general 
sense.  When it came time for the proposal to be put into legislative language, experts from 
other departments and agencies had to be consulted, but with little time for detailed work. 
The original personnel management segment consisted of only general language giving the 
Secretary of the new Department and Director of OPM authority to institute new personnel 
management rules.  It is known from later developments that the anticipated rules would 
address such matters as pay banding, pay-for-performance, employee mobility, and new 
labor-management practices, but none of these issues was expressly addressed in the 
legislation.  Instead, the drafters of the bill took the approach that Congress should establish 
the general framework and intent of the legislation and leave implementation matters to the 
Executive Branch.  As Kay James argues, “You don’t want people on the Hill writing 
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 personnel rules.  There’s nobody up there with the capacity to do it.  I knew the people at 
OPM who did.  What it means when you leave it to the legislators is that whoever has the 
biggest lobby [makes the policy] …and that makes for poor laws.”203  OPM’s Ed Flynn 
explains further: 
[T]his really was an effort to, sort of, create a framework that was different in 
both substance and character from previous efforts. Previous efforts largely 
were tinkering with the articles and provisions of Title 5—sometimes, very 
selectively, sometimes quite broadly. The legislative proposal for the 
department recognized the complexity and attempted, in effect, to set a new 
framework for HR management within the department.204
The strategy of employing only general language had its advantages and 
disadvantages.  The less detail there was expressly stated in the bill, the less there was to be 
debated, argued and amended.  Instead, the administration was able to address their concerns 
for personnel management in broad terms.  When pressed for details and examples, the 
administration seemed actually to lose ground with controversial and debatable examples 
about drunken border guards and the use of radiation detectors.  On the other hand, a paucity 
of detail helped to energize the opposition.  Whether whistleblower protection was ever an 
intended target of the administration, the “notwithstanding” wording gave the unions an 
immediate effective argument, and led them to be able to ask what else might be behind this 
bland proposal. 
Taken together, the strategies of secrecy and general language were very effective, at 
least for the short-term goals of getting the legislation drafted and enacted.  Secrecy not only 
minimized turf wars within the Executive branch, it limited the ability for the opposition to 
mobilize for a fight.  General language forced the debate to be about general principles of 
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 efficiency effectiveness, national security and labor relations policy.  These were policy 
spaces where the administration had a distinct political and rhetorical advantage.  It is 
reasonable to doubt that a more open and detailed approach would have produced a better 
proposal in a timely manner.  In fact, it might be doubtful that any such proposal would have 
survived at all under those circumstances. 
However, later developments, beyond the scope of the present study, suggest that the 
result of secrecy and generality has been that the detailed issues are fought out after 
enactment.  The price of secrecy and generality in the design and enactment phases may very 
well be the difficulties in implementation and successful legal challenges that have been 
experienced post-enactment. 
B.  Congressional Consideration 
The role of Congress and the dynamics of the congressional processes in this case 
present some salient issues.  
1. Majorities and Rules in the House and Senate 
The differences in the ways in which the House and Senate acted on the homeland 
security bill reflect differences in the rules of the two chambers and the impact of party 
majorities in each.  In the House, which was controlled by the majority Republicans, action 
on the President’s bill was fast, coordinated, and led by the Republican leadership.  A rare, if 
not unprecedented, simultaneous referral to and reporting by multiple committees, and a 
special committee chaired by the Majority Leader ensured expedited consideration and a 
prompt vote in the House.  The Senate, however, was split evenly along party lines, and the 
Senate has rules that require extraordinary majorities to limit debate.  Moreover, the initiative 
for homeland security legislation rested with a Democratic Senator who was expected to be a 
strong contender for his party’s presidential nomination.  The political dynamics in the 
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 Senate were very different from those of the House, and efforts to expedite a floor vote were 
frustrated by the inability to invoke cloture.  The Republican leadership in the Senate could 
not have expedited the President’s bill, as did their counterparts in the House. 
2. Interest Groups 
Secondly, interest group influence was a significant factor, particularly in the Senate.  
The ability of the federal employees’ unions to raise issues and mobilize supporters in the 
Senate led to contentious debate and delay beyond initial expectations.  At times they seemed 
to be winning. The role of interest groups in the legislative process is not, in itself, 
remarkable.  What is remarkable in this case is that there were not contesting interest groups, 
as there are in most controversial issues before Congress.  Instead, the federal employee 
unions appear to have been the only interest group on the playing field.  This may well be a 
reflection of the arcane nature of public personnel management.  The community of people 
who are interested in such an issue is small enough—scholars, government managers, 
management experts—but the universe of people who really care about the issue is limited to 
affected employees and their organized representatives. There is no apparent evidence of any 
interest group acting as advocate or intermediary for the administration’s position. Thus, 
instead of opposing interests providing the briefing papers and making the arguments in a 
legislative tug-o-war, the contesting forces here were the administration and the unions, who 
were competing directly with each other for votes. 
3. Failed Compromises and Suspected Motives 
It therefore follows that the administration and the unions were in a position of having 
to deal with each other if compromise and agreement were to be achieved.  In fact, the 
administration was reportedly encouraged by members of Congress to consult with the 
unions.  Both sides indicate that they were willing to make substantial compromises—to “put 
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 a lot on the table.”  Yet, each side perceived unwillingness on the part of the other side to 
make a deal.  How could these highly capable leaders, experienced in policy and politics, 
misread each other’s signals?  It remains unclear what exactly each side was willing to 
negotiate and give up.  It is possible that neither side could have compromised enough on the 
most contentious issues, such as the president’s national security authority, to reach an 
accord.  But, there is also no apparent evidence that serious negotiations took place.  Is it 
possible that the failure to reach a compromise rests in fundamental differences between the 
two sides and the motives they ascribe to each other?  Certainly, the administration and the 
unions were political opponents. If the union leaders truly believed that the administration 
was out to break the unions, and if the administration truly believed that the unionized federal 
bureaucracy was a barrier to good policy and good management, there’s little basis for the 
trust required to make and keep deals.  Sometimes issues just have to be fought to a vote, and 
this may have been the case here. 
4. The Elections 
The outcome of the 2002 congressional elections decided the outcome of the HSA.  
Republicans had gained the majority in the Senate and expanded their margin in the House.  
Pivotal campaigns were influenced, if not decided on issues surrounding the HSA.  Congress 
clearly saw the need to return soon after the election and rid itself of this issue.  A different 
outcome at the polls would certainly have resulted in a different dynamic on Capitol Hill.  
How did the unions and their Democratic supporters get into such a difficult political 
position?  Mark Rogers, former senior advisor on legislative affairs to the Director of OPM 
and an experienced labor policy expert, thinks the unions saw this as “‘a normal policy battle 
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 that ‘we’ve done before. We’ll fight on that, and we hope to prevail.’ But they totally 
misread the bigger issue and how it evolved and how it was viewed from the outside.”205  
Perhaps, but sometimes politicians have to go into an election with whatever they’ve got.   
Each side had some strength in its corner.  Republicans had the advantage of White House 
support and an effective argument based on national security.  Democrats had the support of 
a powerful constituency group, capable of providing campaign support and voter 
mobilization—a winning alliance in past elections.  Miscalculation or not, each side went 
into an important and hard-fought election with some strong political assets.  The legislative 
fight was taken into the political arena; the election outcome decided the legislative outcome. 
C.  Rhetoric and Argumentation 
If the elections were decisive for HSA, then the passage of this historic legislation can 
be largely attributed to the rhetorical framing of the debate.  The public debate over the 
personnel management provision, on Capitol Hill and during the 2002 elections, can help to 
explain the outcome.  The rhetoric of reform was such that, prior to 9/11, the debate over 
civil service reform was stalemated as both sides argued over issues such as strategic human 
capital management, modernization, flexibility, accountability, broadbanding and 
paybanding, performance-based pay, recruitment and retention, union busting and partisan 
differences.  All of these issues were argued over in the post- 9/11 period, as well.  But after 
9/11, the proponents of reform cloaked the management argument in a larger context of 
national security.  On the surface, the debate seemed to have changed from management 
flexibility vs. workers’ rights to national security vs. union collective bargaining.  Examined 
more deeply, the Administration appeared to be more successful in framing the national 
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 security argument more persuasively, especially in presenting a justified strategy, the case for 
protecting the American people, and the necessity for securing the power to provide that 
protection. These differences appear to have been highly influential in the elections and thus 
highly influential in the legislative outcome. 
Ultimately, by connecting public management ideas to the security issue, and 
debating it on a macro-political level in a homeland security venue, the White House was 
able to achieve public management goals where it and others had previously failed.206
D.  Gateway to Civil Service Reform? 
What were the administration’s intentions when personnel management reform was 
included in the HSA?  Was the focus on personnel management for DHS, or was this 
intended as a first step toward broader civil service reform?  There are differing views about 
the intentions behind the HSA personnel provision.  The OPM staff members who worked on 
the language and subsequent regulations say they were focused only on DHS.  From their 
perspective, any precursor for further reform would come later.  According to Ed Flynn: 
What was attempted was to create a framework for human resource 
management that would be right for the public sector for the time, but which 
[...] could also evolve through an open, transparent, regulatory process. [...] 
The emphasis was on creating a framework for this department to come 
together as quickly as possible and to be as effective as possible.207  
However, others saw clearer implications that DHS could be the starting point for wider 
reform. For example, Mason Alinger said, “I know very well that people had every intention 
that, if we can start it here, this is a massive enough agency that we can start to do personnel 
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 reforms more broadly from this point forward.”208 Some saw the opportunity for wider 
application, even though they remained focused on DHS at the time. For example, Joel 
Kaplan observed that the possibilities for expansion were at least in the back of some minds. 
After 9/11, the whole government and the White House was so focused, 
especially at that time, responding to terrorism and the threat post-9/11. So 
we weren’t really looking at using this as a wedge, like a camel’s nose under 
the tent. We were really focused on making this work. That said, I think […] 
others understood, that if you can create something that works, it’s a new 
way, it’ll be a new way of doing business that could serve as a model in the 
future.209   
Bruce Lawlor seemed to agree: “it became clear very early on that if the opportunity 
to create, within the department, a reformed civil service arose, that was going to be 
something this administration was going to go after.”210
Clearly, there are indications that some saw opportunity and intentions for further 
reforms.   The complexity of merging disparate personnel systems into a single agency and 
the urgency of the legislation provided ample opportunity to introduce a new approach to 
personnel management into the new department.  Indeed, the G-5 seemed to think that this 
extension was a simple and logical step and, if the new approach worked, it could be a 
prototype for further reforms.  At the higher policy levels, however, there is the clear 
suggestion that senior White House officials saw this as more than just something to do for 
homeland security; it was a way to advance an important part of the President’s management 
agenda.  Perhaps, then, the question of intention depends on the level of the policy maker.  
The OPM staff say their focus was on DHS; for the G-5 the focus was also on DHS, but with 
an understanding of the implications for advancing the PMA; and perhaps for the most senior 
                                                 
208 Mason Alinger, interview. 
209 Joel Kaplan, interview. 
210 Bruce Lawlor, interview. 
98 
 White House officials, the objective was make a start at widespread reform.  Subsequent 
enactment of the National Security Personnel System for the Department of Defense and the 
administration’s proposed Working for America Act are further evidence of the White House 
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 VII. Summary and Conclusion 
The preceding chapters have discussed the history of civil service reform, presented a 
case history of the enactment of the Homeland Security Act focused on the personnel 
management provisions of the Act, and examined the arguments involved in the debate over 
the HSA personnel management issue.  The story that emerges is one of a rare alignment of 
policy environment, policy opportunity, politics, and rhetorical argument.  The result was 
enactment of legislation that it is reasonable to argue would not otherwise have been 
possible.  
A. Summary and Conclusion 
Since at least the 20th anniversary of the CSRA, many who deal in civil service policy 
have believed that a new round of reform was needed, but achieving reform has proven 
difficult. Indeed, even limited attempts at legislation by recent administrations had failed and, 
instead, innovations in personnel management were pursued mostly in the context of 
demonstration projects.  Yet, this time it was different.  It may now have become a cliché to 
say that “9/11 changed everything,” but 9/11 certainly changed the policy environment in 
which civil service reform was debated in 2002.  Reform was connected to concerns for 
homeland security.  A new and different policy environment was created.   
Urgent legislation provided a policy opportunity: the HSA was the perfect legislative 
vehicle for an approach to personnel management that was already on the minds of 
administration policy makers. With the President’s Management Agenda already developed, 
the HSA represented a fortuitous meeting of preparation and opportunity for the White 
House.  Interviews with administration staff members have shown that inclusion of 
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 “management flexibility” was conceptually so easy that it did not even require much 
discussion. 
The politics of this issue were more complicated.  Here it is difficult to discern 
strategies and motives with certainty.  On the one hand, there are administration officials who 
claim they were just doing what they believed was right and that politics was not a 
consideration. On the other hand, there is a putative Democratic presidential candidate 
pushing an alternative bill in the Senate and politically powerful public employee unions 
with a history of supporting Democrats.  Both the unions and the White House employed the 
leverage of political support when looking for votes on Capitol Hill. In the context of a very 
competitive off-year election, it is tempting, but not sufficiently supported, to think that 
everything was done with an eye on how it might affect the elections.  Regardless of 
intentions, the effects of politics on this issue are quite clear.  Key Democrats who stayed 
with their union constituencies were defeated at the polls. The 2002 congressional elections 
had a decisive effect on the legislation—and vice versa.   
So far, this tells what happened but not why it happened.  Why did the confluence of 
this particular policy environment, policy opportunity, and politics combine to result in 
enactment of controversial civil service reform?  One powerful explanation is the framing of 
the debate and the rhetorical arguments that each side employed.  Simply stated, the 
supporters of reform presented their arguments in terms of national security, and their 
opponents argued in terms of collective bargaining rights.  In some sense this framing was, 
perhaps unwittingly, facilitated by the administration’s decision to draft its proposal using 
only very general language. A debate framed as “national security vs. union special interests” 
is quite different from one that might have been framed as “management flexibility vs. 
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 workers rights,” for instance, or a debate mired in the details of civil service law.  Even when 
both sides addressed the issue of national security, an examination of the different ways they 
addressed strategy, protection and power shows that the administration’s arguments had the 
stronger national security framing.  In the post-911 policy environment, “national security” 
was a political trump card, even damaging the campaign of an undisputable patriot like Max 
Cleland. The difference between pre-9/11 and post- 9/11 debate over civil service reform is 
the introduction of the national security issue. If the first civil service reform was triggered 
by a national calamity, so too were the most recent reforms.  As Bruce Lawlor expressed it, 
“I don’t think you’d see any kind of civil service reform if it wasn’t in the context of this bill.  
Washington just doesn’t move except in times of crisis. [...] This gave them the momentum 
that they needed to try to reform the system.”211   It is hard to imagine something as prosaic as 
management reform otherwise igniting passions beyond those relatively small constituencies 
of affected federal workers and the organizations that represent them. 
B. Implications and Recommendations for Further Study 
Now that HSA is law, there are longer-range implications to be considered. DHS and 
OPM must design and implement new personnel management rules under the full scrutiny of 
interested parties—unions, public employee associations, DHS management, congressional 
committees, etc.  It is likely that such transparency will mean that issues that were not 
debated and resolved during the enactment phase will be contested in the implementation 
phase.  This, in turn has implications for the spread of personnel management reform in the 
federal government.  If the DHS personnel system is really to be “the prototype for the rest of 
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 government in the coming years,”212 much depends upon successful implementation at DHS.  
Though post-enactment developments are beyond the scope of this study, there are clear 
indications that union legal challenges and administrative problems have delayed 
implementation at DHS and also have delayed the deployment of the similar NSPS at the 
Department of Defense.  The administration’s proposed Working for America Act is stalled 
as well.  Further study is recommended to chronicle and analyze the implementation of the 
above legislation for the lessons to be learned for future policy makers and federal managers.
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